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Union Made:
Labor's Litigation for Social Change
Charlotte Garden*
Unions am key repeat players befor the United States Supreme Court. Their
involvement goes beyond what one might expect (labor) and extends to key cases involving
fedetalism, discrimination, affimative action, the FistAmendmen4 and workplace health and
safety among others Though scholars have documented the effects of other union activity like
collective bargainng, on nonunion workers, the role and impact of union participation in
nonlabor ligation has largely been ignowd in both the public debate over unions in Amenca
and in the academic literature about what unions do. This Article focuses on unions'Supreme
Court litigation that arises outside of the context of traditional labor law h order to show how
union-made law affects interests beyond those of the labor movemen4 its members, and
unionized employers. It reveals how union-made law has signdifcandy affected the structum of
American government and society
Ths Article fist describes the many areas in which union Supreme Court litigation has
had important social effects extending far beyond core labor interests and explains why as a
practical matter unions am well-situated to bring or fund these cases. Next theArticle explores
thre characteistics that have the potential to shape unions'litigation positions: Hfis4 unions are
more likely than other social movement hgators to litigate defensively as well as offensively,
second unions operate based on majorityrule; and thb4 unions may use litigation as apart ofa
bargaiing strategy The Aricle shows how these dynamics have played out in past cases,
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sometimes with surpnsig iusult. Finaly the Anicle concludes with some observations
regardmg decling union density m this country
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I. INTRODUCTION
What do unions do? Most people would probably say that they
represent workers' interests at the bargaining table and in grievance
proceedings and that they participate in electoral politics. But this
Article explores an additional way that unions create change within
American society, through their litigation-particularly of cases that
reach beyond traditional labor law-before the United States Supreme
Court. Supreme Court litigation therefore provides a heretofore
unexplored route for unions to be agents of social change.
Unions litigate and facilitate others' Supreme Court litigation in a
number of ways. Most obviously, and most like their employer
counterparts, unions litigate over naturally arising disputes with others.
However, at other times, unions litigate more like social movement
groups, shaping impact cases designed to achieve change through the
courts, or they provide counsel for employees seeking to vindicate
workplace rights. Additionally, labor unions and federations
collectively have a thriving amicus practice. Through these various
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channels, unions have litigated key cases in the areas of federalism,
discrimination, affirmative action, and the First Amendment, among
others.
This Article begins by describing key areas in which unions'
Supreme Court litigation has had important social effects extending far
beyond core labor interests and explains why, as a practical matter,
unions are well situated to bring or fund these cases. Next, the Article
explores three characteristics that can shape unions' litigation
positions: first, unions are more likely than other social movement
litigators to litigate defensively as well as offensively, meaning that
they cannot always choose their litigation vehicles; second, unions
operate based on majority rule, and the interests of different groups of
members may be in opposition in particular cases; and third, unions
may use litigation to facilitate success at the bargaining table.
Ultimately, the Article concludes that the importance of unions'
nonlabor litigation has been underestimated and that while unions do
not litigate precisely like other left-leaning social movement groups,
these groups should generally welcome unions' intercessions in the
Supreme Court. Finally, the Article proposes that unions' Supreme
Court litigation is most likely to succeed as a social change strategy
where it occurs in coalition with other groups and recommends that
unions should better communicate with their members about the scope
and content of their litigation efforts, particularly before the Supreme
Court.
II. UNIONS AND THE SUPREME COURT
Justified or not, the Supreme Court has a
kid ofsacred status in American life.
This Part begins with a brief discussion of the evolution of
unions' participation in Supreme Court litigation. The purpose is
twofold: first, to discuss several foundational Supreme Court cases in
which labor played a key role, and second, to describe how courts' and
legislatures' views of labor's Supreme Court work has changed over
time. Specifically, it shows that whereas the historical record reveals
some early hostility toward union-sponsored litigation, modem
doctrine permits unions to take a variety of different roles in litigation.
Following this discussion, I create a taxonomy of subject areas that
1. Jon Meacham, Why Obama Shouldn'tDeclar War on the Supreme Court TIME




have prompted union Supreme Court litigation. This discussion both
illuminates the scope of unions' influence through litigation and
provides necessary background for Part I, where I describe three
dynamics that can inform the positions that unions take before the
Supreme Court.
Before beginning this discussion, though, it is worthwhile to
address two preliminary questions. First, why focus on the Supreme
Court, when so few cases end up there?2 And second, why focus on
non-labor law cases? The answers to both questions can be found in
this Article's objective, which is to analyze an important way in which
unions influence the lives of nonmembers-which is to say, the vast
majority of Americans.! In addition, unions' Supreme Court work
offers a high-profile window into how unions view specific challenges
facing workers.
Accordingly, I focus on Supreme Court litigation in part because
of its precedential value, but also because of the money and expertise
required of those who appear regularly in the Supreme Court.
Professor Richard Lazarus has observed that Supreme Court work is
increasingly done by a small group of elite lawyers.4 Their expertise
gives them a leg up in obtaining the best possible outcomes for their
clients at both the certiorari and merits stages.! However, the vast
majority of these attorneys work primarily for for-profit clients;' only a
relatively small number of nonprofits can afford for lawyers to devote
the large amount of time necessary to become expert Supreme Court
litigators.' And, while some private lawyers also perform pro bono
work, they do not take on pro bono clients whose interests might
conflict with those of the lawyers' paying clients. Thus, Lazarus
observed, "[A]lmost all of the [specialty Supreme Court] practices
2. See, e.g., 2011 Term Opinions of the Court SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term-11 (last visited Oct. 27,
2013) (listing opinions for all seventy-eight cases heard during the October 2011 Term).
3. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members-2011, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR I (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2 01272012.pdf
("In 2011, the union membership rate-the percent of wage and salary workers who were
members of a union-was 11.8 percent, essentially unchanged from 11.9 percent in 2010.").
4. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Thmnsformnag the Court by Tansforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
5. Id. at 1515, 1540; Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Captur at the IIgh Cour 119
YALE L.J. ONLNE 89, 90-91 (2009) (showing an increasing percentage of successful petitions
for certiorari filed by "expert Supreme Court advocates").
6. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 1556-58.
7. Id. at 1501 (noting that most nonprofit organizations lack in-house Supreme
Court expertise, with a few exceptions, such as Public Citizen and the ACLU).
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refuse to provide ... help to plaintiffs involved in employment
discrimination, tort, and environmental pollution control cases."
Against this backdrop, the labor movement is exceptional in its
capacity to advocate before the Supreme Court in a broad range of
issue areas, including those eschewed (at least on the plaintiff side) by
other Supreme Court experts. A number of labor lawyers have
substantial Supreme Court experience.! In particular, Laurence
Gold-former general counsel of the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and current of-
counsel at the union-side labor firm Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC-
stands out.'o He is among the twenty lawyers who have argued the
most Supreme Court cases during the twentieth century," and he has
developed an enviable reputation as an expert Supreme Court litigator;
in the words of one Supreme Court justice: "Whenever I get a brief
signed by Larry Gold, I read it-even if it is an amicus brief-with
particular care."" Thus, as compared to other social movement groups,
labor unions have uncommon institutional capacity to litigate before
the Supreme Court." And this capacity is often deployed in
employment and even environmental cases, precisely the areas where
private Supreme Court practitioners are unlikely to provide pro bono
assistance and other nonprofits' resources may be stretched thin.
This Article focuses on cases that arise outside of labor law
because those are the cases that have the most readily apparent effects
on the lives of nonunion members. This is not to say that labor law
does not affect nonunion members-assuredly, it does. For example,
8. Id. at 1560.
9. For example, before her appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Marsha Berzon argued at least five cases before the Supreme Court.
Michael Gottesman, now a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, argued seventeen
cases. OYEz, http://www.oyez.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (search for Berzon and
Gottesman to view a list of cases each argued).
10. Laurence Gold BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C., http://www.bredhoff.
comf/index.php/attorneys/Of-CounselLaurence-Gold (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). I was an
associate at Bredhoff & Kaiser from 2005 to 2008.
11. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 1492-93 & n.29.
12. Conference, Rex E Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the
United States, 2003 BYU L. REv 1, 85 (quoting Charles Fried in a panel discussion).
13. This is not to say that unions are the only nonprofits with significant Supreme
Court practices. Groups like the NAACP LDF and the ACLU have significant Supreme
Court practices. In addition, the United States Chamber of Commerce also participates in
Supreme Court litigation on a regular basis and on a wide range of cases. See Nat'l Chamber
Litig. Ctr., About U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.chamberlitigation.coml/about





some employees who are covered by a union contract are not union
members, 4 and labor law protects concerted activities undertaken by
nonunion workers." However, the observation that labor unions
litigate cases about labor law is hardly a surprising one. In contrast,
unions' nonlabor litigation both reveals key labor movement priorities
and has more potential to influence society as a whole. Yet it has been
largely ignored."
In sum, unions' nonlabor Supreme Court litigation represents a
major investment of union resources in cases with effects that reach far
beyond unions, union members, and unionized workplaces. In the
next Subpart, this Article recounts a brief history of union Supreme
Court litigation, emphasizing the evolving role of unions in litigation
and providing several early examples of seminal cases litigated by the
labor movement and its adherents.
A. Unions 'Paths to the Supreme Court
"For my fiends, anything-for my enemies, the law' 7
Labor unions' decades-long history of Supreme Court litigation
predates the advent of federal labor statutes like the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). However, early appearances before the
Supreme Court rarely provided unions with cause for celebration.
Employers and government lawyers successfully argued that labor
union activism was illegal under a range of antitrust and criminal law
14. Workers who are covered by a union contract cannot be required to join a union
or pay the full amount of union dues; rather, they can at most be required to pay the "agency
fee," which represents the costs of bargaining, grievance administration, and a few other
union activities. In "right to work" states, workers covered by union contracts need not pay
even the agency fee, though they are still covered by the union contract. See Charlotte
Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Futue ofLabor Speech Rights?, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1, 34,36-37 (2011).
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
16. There are a few exceptions. Eg., Jaime Eagan, Making an Inpact: The Labor
Movementh Use ofLitgation To Achieve Social and Economic Justice, SSRN 21 (June 18,
2011), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1866844 ("Few sources ...
mention labor's involvement in social justice impact litigation."). Scholars have done
empirical studies of the frequency with which unions, among other groups, file Supreme
Court amicus briefs. E.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest Group
Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the US. Supirme Court 32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
955 (2007); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Cuiae Biefs
on the Supreme Cout, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 752 (2000). However, those studies do not
discuss the types of cases in which unions file amicus briefs or the substance of the briefs
themselves.
17. This phrase has been attributed to former Brazilian President Getilio Vargas.
Robert Plummer, Ruses That Spring fm Bmzil Woes, BBC NEwS (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/4468042.stm.
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theories.'" On several occasions, these disputes reached the Supreme
Court. For example, in Loewe v Lawlor, the well-known Danbury
Hatters case, the Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited
a union secondary boycott, subjecting individual strikers (who were
named defendants) to treble damages.'9 A series of other cases
reinforced this conclusion, even after Congress exempted core union
activity from antitrust liability in the Clayton Act.20 At the same time,
the Lochner-era" Court repeatedly applied the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state statutes aimed at
protecting labor activity."
During the same period, labor activists litigated important First
Amendment cases, including Abnwas v United States, Debs v United
States, and Whitney v California" Each of these cases began with the
defendant's criminal conviction for labor-related political activities:
Abrams's circulation of flyers calling on the "Workers of the World" to
unite against capitalism by going on a general strike;24 Debs's public
speech extolling the virtues of socialism and denouncing war;25 and
Whitney's participation in the Communist Labor Party, which had
called for "the organization of the workers into 'revolutionary
18. Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are Fist Amendment Values: Why Union
Comprehensive CampaignsAre Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2617, 2624 (2011).
19. 208 U.S. 274, 283-85, 292, 309 (1908), superseded by statute, Clayton Antitrust
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
20. E.g., Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921)
(holding that the Clayton Act did not eliminate union antitrust liability for certain collective
action, including secondary strikes); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921) (same), superseded by statute, Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70
(1932). These cases significantly limited workers' collective action until Congress passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which eliminated federal courts' jurisdiction to enjoin labor disputes.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-33 (1941)
(concluding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act also eliminated damages liability for picketing
and striking).
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), andFerguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (striking down a state law
protecting picketing activity); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state
law prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign "yellow dog contracts," in which
the employee agreed to refrain from joining a union).
23. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
24. Abmms, 250 U.S. at 620-21.
25. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-15. Eugene Debs was a founding member of the Industrial
Workers of the World and of the American Railway Union, which famously defied a court
injunction to continue a strike against the Pullman Company. Ahmed A. White, The Crime of
Economic Radicalism: Crimnal Syndicahsm Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World
1917-1927, 85 OR. L. REv 649, 666-67 (2006).
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industrial unions."' 26 The Supreme Court upheld all three convictions,
but Abrams and Whitney also offered occasions for Justices Holmes
and Brandeis to articulate-albeit in a dissent and concurrence 27-their
"profoundly influential,"28  "seminal"" theories of the First
Amendment, which continue to undergird our understanding of free
speech today.
The passage of the NLRA improved unions' fortunes before the
Supreme Court and also led to one of the most influential federalism
cases in Supreme Court history. ALRB v Jones & Laughhn Steel
Corp. began with what would now be considered a run-of-the-mill
unfair labor practice charge, in which a labor union alleged that the
company had discriminated against union members." The company
argued that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to regulate
manufacturing and production, citing "[a]n unbroken line of decisions
under the commerce clause."" In response, Justice Owen Roberts
made his famous "switch in time," creating a five-vote majority in
favor of expanded federal authority and setting the stage for the
survival of other components of the New Deal.32
Even after labor unions were legitimated by the NLRA, federal
and state governments periodically manifested discomfort with the
idea that labor unions might drive litigation. This discomfort
manifested in reform of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Unions
had seized on the FLSA when it was enacted in 1938, filing "collective
actions" against employers who were alleged to have violated wage-
and-hour requirements." This practice drew congressional disapproval
of suits filed by "outsiders" who were "desirous of stirring up litigation
26. fitney, 274 U.S. at 364.
27. Id. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
28. Robert Post, Reconcilig Theory and Doctrine in Fist Amendment Jwispru-
dence, 88 CALF. L. REv. 2353, 2356 (2000).
29. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Curious Concurrnce: Justice
Bmndeisk Vote in Whitney v. California, 2005 SuP. CT. REv. 333, 334.
30. 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937).
31. Brief for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. at 27, 64, Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1
(No. 419), 1937 WL 34884, at *27, *64; see also Jones& Laughlh, 301 U.S. at 25.
32. Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the
Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1, 20 (2011). Scholars debate the
accuracy of the phrase "switch in time" as applied to the 1937 Court. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin
M. Quinn, Dida Switch in Time Save Nine., 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 69, 71 (2010). However,
the resolution of that debate is not necessary here; it is sufficient that Jones & Laughlin is
today regarded as a critical moment in Supreme Court history.
33. Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights byMisapplyng ClassAction Rules, 61 AM.UL.REv. 523, 533 (2012).
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without being an employee at all."34 Accordingly, Congress amended
the FLSA in 1947, prohibiting employees from allowing designated
representatives to sue on their behalves, and instead requiring them to
sue in their own names." This limit still applies today," although, as
this Article discusses below, unions continue to educate workers about
their FLSA rights and to fund FLSA cases, including some resulting in
major federalism-related holdings."
States, too, have at times sought to prevent unions from
encouraging their members to pursue legal claims. Ironically, these
statutes led to major union victories in court. The Supreme Court has
on four occasions rejected state prohibitions on the provision of free
legal advice or attorney referrals by associations; three of these cases
involved unions. In Brotherhood of Railroad Tramnen v Virgiia ex
rel. Vriia State Bar, the Court overturned a state court's order
enjoining the Brotherhood's legal referral plan, which was aimed at
workers who had been injured on the job, and held that the
Brotherhood had a First Amendment right to make legal referrals."
Relying on NAACP v Button," decided the previous year, the Court
described the legal referral system as integral to the practice of trade
unionism: "The right of members to consult with each other in a
fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to select a
spokesman from their number who could be expected to give the
wisest counsel.*" Additionally, the Court observed that the
Brotherhood's efforts were targeted in part at enforcing legislation for
which the union had lobbied, including the Safety Appliance Act and
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. As the Court put it, the statutes
could not fulfill their intended purpose if injured trainmen lacked
meaningful access to the courts.41
34. Id. (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947)).
35. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 2(e), 61 Stat. 84, 86 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 252(e) (2006)).
36. Id
37. See discussion infr Part I.I..
38. 377 U.S. 1, 2, 5-6 (1964).
39. 371 U.S. 415, 442 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment protected the
NAACP's practice of holding meetings of parents and children to solicit potential plaintiffs
for school desegregation cases and concluding that Virginia's interest in regulating the legal
profession by prohibiting solicitation by lawyers had to give way to the NAACP's interest in
employing "constitutionally privileged means of expression to secure constitutionally
guaranteed civil rights").
40. Bhd ofR.R. Tranmen, 377 U.S. at 6.
41. Id. at 3.
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Three years later, the Court addressed another union's legal
assistance plan in United Mne Workers of America, District 12 v
Illinois State Bar Assn.42 There, the United Mine Workers "had
employed a licensed attorney on a salary basis to represent any of its
members who wished his services to prosecute workmen's
compensation claims before the Illinois Industrial Commission." As
in Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainmen, the Court held that the program
was protected by the First Amendment, noting that it had arisen out of
the union's perception that the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Statute was at risk of failing to fulfill its promise due to lack of
competent enforcement.' Finally, in United Transportation Union v
State Bar ofMichigan, the Court again overturned state bar sanctions
imposed on a union for referring its members to attorneys who agreed
to a particular fee arrangement.45 The Court stressed that Button, Mine
Workers, and Trainmen were to be read broadly to establish that
"collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment," including actions designed to help members afford
counsel."
Thus, unions were instrumental in establishing that the First
Amendment protects associations' rights both to make attorney
referrals and to encourage members to enforce their rights through
litigation, including by providing legal counsel. Importantly, many
advocacy groups advancing a wide range of interests today rely on this
principle in order to bring cases designed to spur social change.47
In the union context, funding of members' litigation sometimes
occurs on a case-by-case basis-for example, a union, believing that
an employee has been fired, underpaid, or otherwise mistreated in
contravention of federal law, may decide to fund that worker's suit
against the employer.48 However, it can also occur in a more routinized
42. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id at 223-24.
45. 401 U.S. 576, 584-86 (1971) ("[Tlhe Union sought to protect its members from
excessive legal fees by securing an agreement from the counsel it recommends that the fee
will not exceed 25% of the recovery, and that the percentage will include all expenses
incidental to investigation and litigation.").
46. Id. at 585.
47. Eg, About theACLU, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last visited Oct.
27, 2013); Who WeAre, LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/about-ldf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
48. Eg., Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 59 (2002) ("Unions and their lawyers have represented store clerks
seeking back wages for uncompensated overtime work; Thai garment workers who were held
202 [Vol. 88:193
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fashion, as when a labor union provides access to attorneys as a benefit
of union membership. For example, since 1978, the United Auto
Workers' (UAW) collective bargaining agreement with auto
manufacturers has provided active workers, retirees, and workers'
spouses with access to free civil legal services in a range of subject
areas (Plan).49 The Plan was sacrificed in the most recent round of
bargaining between the UAW and the major auto companies-a loss
that made the front page of the Detroit Free Pres?-and will stop
taking new cases at the end of 2013." However, for the last twenty-
five years, the Plan, which bills itself as "the largest pre-paid legal
services program in the country,'5 2 has assisted workers with divorces,
personal bankruptcies, and other issues." And, of particular note for
purposes of this Article, cases handled by Plan attorneys occasionally
reach the United States Courts of Appeals and, on at least one
occasion, even the Supreme Court: in Till v SCS Credit Corp.,
attorneys from the UAW-DaimlerChrysler Legal Services Plan
successfully represented two bankruptcy petitioners arguing that they
should be entitled to pay a lower "formula rate" of interest on a loan
in virtual slavery in an El Monte, California sweatshop; employees suffering unsafe working
conditions at poultry processing plants; and janitors seeking minimum wages." (footnotes
omitted)).
49. See The Plan, UAW LSP http://www.uawlsp.com/theplan.asp (last visited Oct.
27, 2013) (describing eligibility criteria for the Plan and listing subject areas in which Plan
attorneys will provide assistance). Notably excluded from the Plan's coverage are lawsuits
that name the beneficiary worker's employer or union as a defendant. The legal services
provided under the Plan are "free" in the sense that members availing themselves of those
services do not pay a per-service or hourly fee. However, the Plan is funded in part by union
dues, which all members pay. The Plan's Web site asserts that these costs are low: "With
efficient practices, the Plan has kept costs down, generally costing approximately $6 per
month for each member[-]much less than the cost of just about any other type of benefit."
Statement from the Dector, m Legal Services Plan Opening New Cases Through the End of
2013, UAW LSP, http://www.uawlsp.com/default.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). Further, the
Plan's Web site indicates that about 75% of eligible union members take advantage of the
Plan at some point in their tenure.
50. See Brent Snavely, GM-UAW Deal Would End Fve Divorces, Legal Help,
DETROiT FREE PRESS, Sept. 24, 2011, at Al.
51. Legal Services Plan Openig New Cases Through the End of2013, supra note 49
("Under the terms of the tentative 2011 contract between the UAW and GM, Ford and
Chrysler, the Plan will continue to accept new cases on the same basis we have in the past,
until December 31, 2013. We will handle all the cases that come in, and continue to handle
the cases that have been opened by the end of 2013 until they are completed.").
52. About Us, UAW LSP, http://www.uawlsp.com/about.asp (last visited Oct. 27,
2013).
53. In 2008, the Plan's attorneys assisted over 9,000 workers with bankruptcy
matters, nearly 7,000 workers with divorces, and nearly 3,000 workers with foreclosures.
Brent Snavely, UAW Fights To Keep Free Legal Services, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 17,
2009, at Al2.
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secured by a $4000 truck, instead of the much higher rate sought by
the creditor.54
In addition, the Supreme Court has recently allowed unions and
other groups a third, hybrid method of litigating in members' interests,
termed "associational standing."' Associational standing permits
groups to litigate on their members' behalves provided three conditions
are met: (1) at least one member has been or will be injured, (2) that
member could sue individually, and (3) "the nature of the claim and of
the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each
injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause."" This
allows unions to enforce members' rights with relatively little
participation by the members themselves, a dynamic that can
"provide[] for greater and more effective access to the courts," but that
also presents risks, including that there may be conflicting interests
among the union's membership."
Finally, labor unions and federations appear as amici in a wide
range of cases, many of which concern subjects other than labor law.
This long-standing practice began in earnest in 1948," when future
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg was appointed general
counsel of the CIO and "given a free hand to select labor cases to take
to the Supreme Court and to file amicus briefs in cases already
54. 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
55. This principle was first established by the Supreme Court in a decision allowing
the UAW to seek a declaratory judgment ensuring that members who had been laid off from
work received full trade readjustment benefits. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1986).
Then, in United Food & Commerial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc., the
Supreme Court expanded Brock to permit a union to sue for damages under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act on behalf of its members. 517 U.S.
544 (1996).
56. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,511 (1975).
57. Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standig for Oganizations with
Internal Conflicts of Intems; 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 351, 351 (2002). Additionally, the Brown
Group Court identified two other risks: a potential lack of "adversarial intensity" and that
"the damages recovered by the association [could] fail to find their way into the pockets of
the members on whose behalf injury is claimed." 517 U.S. at 556.
58. Before 1948, labor federations filed amicus briefs only sporadically, generally in
labor or employment law cases, as well as a handful of high-profile civil rights cases. Eg.,
Brief of AFL, Amicus Curiae, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275
(1946) (No. 970), 1946 WL 50088 (veterans' reemployment and superseniority); Brief for
AFL, Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (No. 19), 1938 WL 39360
(NLRB jurisdiction and procedure); Application for Leave To File Brief Amicus & Brief
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of CIO & Certain Affiliated Organizations, Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 72), 1947 WL 44164 (racially restrictive housing covenants).
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scheduled for Supreme Court review."" Goldberg interpreted this
mandate as an invitation to file briefs that would, in his view,
"safeguard[] the interests of the entire labor movement and, indeed, the
public interest generally."' This was before it became common
practice for interest groups to file amicus briefs in the Supreme Court;
one study showed that a grand total of 531 amicus briefs were filed
during the ten-year span from 1946 to 1955, as compared to 4,907
amicus briefs filed between 1986 and 1995.61 Thus, while the CIO was
not the only institution to engage regularly in amicus practice in the
late 1940s, it was among a relatively small group that did so.
Under Goldberg's leadership, the CIO filed briefs not only in
labor cases, but also in civil rights and First Amendment cases.
Among them were amicus briefs filed in several cases challenging
racial segregation in education' and public accommodations." In
those cases, the CIO described its interest in defeating "the power of
the states to compel segregation," which "directly affect[s] the efforts
of the CIO to build a non-segregated trade union movement in the
United States."' Similarly, the CIO fought discriminatory laws
enacted in the wake of World War II, including Hawaii's English-only
education law" and California's statutory denial of fishing licenses to
Japanese immigrants." Additionally, during this period, the CIO filed
briefs in three cases presenting issues related to the First Amendment
rights of protest groups. These cases involved the extent to which the
59. Katherine VW. Stone, The Steelworkers' Trilogy: The Evoludon of Labor
Arbiuadon, in LABOR LAW STORIES 149, 159 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005).
60. Id. at 160.
61. Kearney & Merrill, supm note 16, at 752.
62. Brief for the CIO as Amicus Cuiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(No. 1), 1953 WL 78290; Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (No. 34), 1950 WL 78678; Brief for the CIO
as Arnicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(No. 44), 1949 WL 50364.
63. Motion for Leave To File Brief & Brief of CIO Amicus Curiae, Henderson v.
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25), 1949 WL 50336 (challenging segregation in
railroad dining cars).
64. Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, McLauin, supr note 62, at 2.
65. Brief of CIO, Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S.
368 (1949) (No. 52), 1948 WL 47231, at *2-3 (challenging on the dual grounds that the law
would "augment existing racial, religious and nationalistic discord" and discriminate against
non-English speaking teachers).
66. Brief of CIO Amicus Cwiae, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (No. 533), 1948 WL 47436.
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government could prohibit communists from leading labor unions,"
the right to picket stores in order to encourage them to hire racial
minorities, and the availability of civil remedies under the Ku Klux
Klan Act to individuals who were systematically assaulted by groups
of private citizens."
After the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO, the newly combined
federation continued filing Supreme Court amicus briefs. While the
federation's amicus participation has ebbed and flowed over time," the
AFL-CIO today remains a prolific filer of amicus briefs." For
example, from the five-year period beginning with the October 2007
Supreme Court Term and ending with the October 2011 Term, the
AFL-CIO filed fifteen amicus briefs, eleven of which did not concern
labor law.72 Some of these briefs were filed in high-profile cases, like
Nadonal Federadon ofIndependent Bushess v Sebeliu or Arizona v
United States,74 where the AFL-CIO was one of dozens of amici.
Others came in cases that received far less amicus attention, like
Kasten v Sant-Gobain Performance Plasdcs Corp., in which the Court
considered whether an oral complaint was sufficient to trigger the
FLSA; there, the AFL-CIO filed one of only six amicus briefs."
Other AFL-CIO amicus briefs filed during that period came in cases
67. Eg., Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950) (No. 10), 1949 WL 50300.
68. Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950) (No. 61), 1949 WL 50403.
69. Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951)
(No. 217), 1950 WL 78611.
70. Westlaw and Lexis reveal twenty-eight AFL-CIO amicus briefs filed in nonlabor
cases between 1971 and 1980, sixty filed between 1981 and 1990, twenty-eight between
1991 and 2000, and thirty-five between 2001 and the present. (List of cases on file with
author.) By contrast, the late 1950s and 1960s saw the AFL-CIO file relatively few amicus
briefs in cases that did not concern labor law.
71. Many of these briefs are discussed in this Article. In addition, it is telling that
Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill selected the AFL-CIO as one of three
institutional litigators with a history of filing Supreme Court amicus briefs to study the
efficacy of that practice. Kearney & Merrill, supm note 16, at 750.
72. A Westlaw search conducted on September 29, 2013, in the "U.S. Supreme Court
Briefs" database for documents filed on dates corresponding to the October 2007 Term to the
October 2011 Term that contain "AFL-CIO" or "American Federation of Labor" in the title
returns fifteen amicus briefs filed by the AFL-CIO.
73. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners Suggesting
Reversal of the Decision Below on the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue, Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 293719.
74. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Culae in Support of Respondent, Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1054499.
75. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
76. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kasten, 131 S.
Ct. 1325 (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 2565286.
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concerning international law," the viability of a Title VII class action,"
the First Amendment," the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act," consumer arbitration,' separation of
federal powers,82 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." And, while the efficacy of any particular amicus
strategy is beyond the scope of this Article, there is some empirical
evidence that AFL-CIO amicus briefs are successful."
The AFL-CIO files amicus briefs far more frequently than the
other major American labor federation, Change to Win." Change to
Win filed Supreme Court amicus briefs in only six cases (five of
which did not concern labor law) between the 2007 and 2011 Terms."
This relatively low amicus participation rate is perhaps unsurprising
given Change to Win's pledge to devote three-quarters of its operating
77. See Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813560.
78. See Brief of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union et al. as
Amic Curiae in Support of Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 794122.
79. See Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cwiae in Support of Respondent, Borough
of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (No. 09-1476), 2011 WL 288884.
80. See Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of Petitioner, Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400), 2010 WL 2770107.
81. See Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Rent-A-
Center, W, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 1393447.
82. See Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3370511.
83. See Brief Amicus Cuiae of the National Education Ass'n et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (No. 07-474), 2008 WL
563435.
84. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 750 ("We also track the amicus records of
the American Civil Liberties Union ('ACLU'), the American Federation of Labor-Congress
of Industrial Organizations ('AFL-CIO'), and the States, and find that they enjoy some
success as amicus filers, although less than the Solicitor General.").
85. Ann C. Hodges, Avoidig Legal Seduction: Reinvigomting the Labor Movement
To Balance Corpomte Power, 94 MARQ. L. REv. 889, 892-93 (2011).
86. See Brief of the AFL-CIO & Change to Win as Amici Cuiae in Support of
Respondents, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (No. 07-581), 2008 WL
2817677; Brief of the AFL-CIO & Change to Win as Amici Cuiae in Support of
Respondent, Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657),
2006 WL 3735955; Brief of the Alliance for Retired Americans et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (No.
06-593), 2007 WL 951137; Brief of Amici Cuiae Change to Win & the Change to Win
Investment Group in Support of Respondents, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784
(2010) (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 3477290; Brief for Change to Win & the CtW Investment
Group as Amici Cuiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701933; Brief of the United Food
& Commercial Workers International Union et al. as Amici Cuiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 78.
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budget to funding new organizing efforts, leaving fewer resources
available for expensive Supreme Court litigation." Interestingly,
though, the briefs that Change to Win did file suggest that it has a
somewhat different amicus strategy than the AFL-CIO. In particular,
Change to Win, along with the Change to Win Investment Group, filed
briefs in two securities litigation cases." (By contrast, the AFL-CIO
did not participate in any Supreme Court securities litigation cases
during the same time period.) In these cases, Change to Win sought to
expand liability for securities fraud"' and make it easier for plaintiffs to
bring securities cases." This focus goes hand in hand with Change to
Win's organizing and advocacy model, which includes shareholder
activism."
This Subpart has outlined the primary avenues through which
unions engage in Supreme Court advocacy. This is not to suggest that
these are the only avenues. In addition, unions may facilitate litigation
in less formal ways, for example, by helping workers identify potential
violations of their workplace rights and providing attorney referrals."
87. The inaugural chair of Change to Win, Anna Burger, described that federation's
goals like this: "Strategic, smart, organizing is our core principle-our North Star .... We
will put our money where our mouth is, with three-quarters of our resources going to a
groundbreaking organizing crusade." New Labor Fedemtion Pledges To Carry Out Most
Aggwssive Organizing Campaig in 50 Years, CHANGE 'I WIN (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.
changetowin.org/news/new-labor-federation-pledges-carry-out-most-aggressive-organizing-
campaign-50-years (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hodges, supra note 85, at
893.
88. The Change to Win Investment Group works with union-sponsored pension funds
to engage in shareholder activism because
[t]he long-term health of these pension plans, and the retirement security of the
workers and families who rely upon them, are threatened by conflicts of interest on
Wall Street and in the boardroom, a corporate backlash that seeks to weaken the
accountability of executives to shareholders, and outright corporate fraud.
About CtW Investment Group, CTW INVESTMENT GROuP, http://www.ctwinvestmentgroup.
com/about/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
89. Brief for Change to Win & the CtW Investment Group as Amid Cuiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 86, at 4-6.
90. Brief of Amici Cuiae Change to Win & the Change to Win Investment Group in
Support of Respondents, supra note 86, at 3-5.
9 1. Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Peispectives on Risk, Inequality and
Democracy, 30 CoM. LAB. L. & Po'Y J. 17, 48 (2008) ("As compared to the [Change to
Win] unions, the AFL-CIO's national unions are less likely to engage in capital-market
activities [in support of organizing].").
92. Increasingly, unions help fund workers' centers to assist workers in nonunion
workplaces. Workers' center staff provide advice on issues like wage and hour violations and
immigration law and therefore are a particularly promising avenue through which unions can
help nonunion workers assert their rights. E.g., Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave
Oiganimag: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.YL.
SCH. L. REv. 465, 467 (2005-2006) (describing workers' center strategies, including providing
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Additionally, they may recruit named plaintiffs for class actions or urge
workers to opt into FLSA collective actions. The next Subpart will
briefly describe some of the many substantive areas in which labor
unions facilitate in litigation.
B. Subjects of Unions'Supreme Court Ligation
The focus was.. . on shapig the law so that it would benefit the labor
movement (and hence Amenca!) over the long run."
In this Subpart, I illustrate the range of Supreme Court cases in
which unions participate as parties or amici. I have grouped these
cases into six categories. First, and most prevalent, are cases that
concern conditions of employment. These work law cases cover topics
like employment discrimination, wage-and-hour law, workplace health
and safety, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). Second, there are democracy-related cases that concern the
political process, access to government, and civic engagement more
generally, including First Amendment rights to protest. Third, there are
cases related to the structure of government-either the relationship
between the federal government and the states94 or the relationship
between the branches of the federal government. Fourth, there are
cases about civil practice and procedure. Fifth, there are cases about
issues of community concern, such as the availability of affordable
housing or the protection of the environment. Sixth, and finally, there
are industry-specific issues in which unions become involved because
they represent workers in the relevant industry.
Three caveats are in order. First, many cases will fall into
multiple categories; often, the reason a client decides to sue is
substantially different from the reason the Supreme Court agrees to
hear the case. To take just one example, unions litigated both Alden v
Maind' and Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Trnsit Authoritf-
"services such as legal representation, language classes, health care referrals, and advocacy");
Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker Ozganizng: Buildng a Contempoary
Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REv. 413, 428-29 (2012). But see Hodges,
supm note 85, at 904 (describing an assessment by organizers at the Garment Workers'
Center in Los Angeles that "focus on legal actions created significant problems," including
that the strategy did not keep workers sufficiently involved in the campaign and that workers
came to view the center as a service provider).
93. Michael Gottesman, DavidFeller, SeniorPartner 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
265,267 (2003).
94. There are a significant number of cases about the extent to which the NLRA
preempts state laws. However, those cases are beyond the scope of this Article.
95. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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key federalism cases that are regularly featured in constitutional law
textbooks"-to enforce the FLSA against state governments."
Because the underlying wage and hour issues that gave rise to these
cases in the first place were relatively ordinary, I group these and
similar cases in category three (structure of government), rather than
category one (work law). However, this is not to underplay the
importance of unions' expensive and time-consuming litigation of
work law issues in the Supreme Court.
Second, this is not an exhaustive list of all the cases, or even the
categories of cases, in which unions have participated as parties,
provided legal representation, or filed amicus briefs. For example, this
Subpart generally does not discuss union participation in antitrust or
securities cases.9 Instead, it offers example cases to illustrate the
breadth of issues in which unions are involved, as well as to provide a
sense of the extent to which unions' litigation positions might align
with or diverge from those of other social movement groups.
Third, although the Article sometimes refers to the views of the
"labor movement," I do not mean to imply that the labor movement
has a monolithic view of the importance or the substantive correctness
of particular cases. Where different unions or federations take
different views before the Court, I flag them. However, where only
one union perspective is advanced before the Court, I do not discuss
the likelihood that other unions or federations (or their members) held,
but did not express to the Court, other views.
1. Work Law
Unsurprisingly, the largest category of unions' nonlabor Supreme
Court work falls under the general heading of work law." I include
96. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787.
97. Eg., ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178, 303 (3d ed. 2009).
98. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that Congress cannot compel states to hear suits
relating to violations of federal law in state courts; the plaintiffs were represented by AFL-
CIO attorneys); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56 (holding that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to compel state employers to pay federally mandated minimum wage).
Garcia was represented by union lawyers, including the AFL-CIO General Counsel Laurence
E. Gold and Amalgamated Transit Union General Counsel Earle Putnam. Id at 529.
99. See discussion supa Part II.A.
100. See Eagan, supm note 16, at 24-27; Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the
Righ-Based Workplace, 25 US.E. L. REv. 169, 200-05 (1991) (describing individual unions'
practices of providing representation or legal referrals for members' claims under Title VII,
the WARN Act, and other employment statutes).
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here employment law,'1  employment discrimination,' 2 workplace
health and safety,'o3 and retirement benefits.'"
Unions play a role in the development of employment law in both
union and nonunion workplaces. In unionized workplaces, the
connection is obvious: unions often either provide counsel to
bargaining unit members or sue in their own names (often alongside
individual employees) to enforce members' workplace rights."' In
nonunion workplaces, the connection is perhaps less clear, but present
nonetheless. First, labor lawyers sometimes represent nonunionized
workers directly, often (but not always) in connection with an
organizing campaign.'6 Second, even if .they do not provide
representation, they may provide advice and attorney referrals through
a workers' center or similar organization.' Conversely, unions
themselves employ significant numbers of employees, and they
sometimes also play a gatekeeping role in employment by operating
hiring halls.' Thus, unions are sometimes named as defendants in
employment-related litigation as well.
As a result, labor unions have been parties to a significant
number of work law cases that have reached the Supreme Court; of
these, discrimination cases comprise the bulk. Accordingly, this
Subpart begins with a discussion of unions' participation in
discrimination cases and then turns to other types of work law cases,
such as those concerning the constitutional rights of public employees.
101. Eg., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.,
517 U.S. 544 (1996).
102. See discussion infra Part III.
103. E.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990), superseded by statute, Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163; Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
104. Eg., Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96 (2007); Brown v. Hotel & Rest.
Emps. & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54,468 U.S. 491 (1984).
105. E.g., AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009); Johnson Controls, 499 U.S.
187. The Communications Workers of America were a party in the Title VII gender
discrimination suit. AT&TCorp., 556 U.S. 701.
106. Fisk, supm note 48, at 59-60 (noting that some courts construe the provision of
legal services immediately before a union election as a violation of the NLRA).
107. See Janice Fine et al., Nat'l Study on Immigrant Worker Ctrs. 2005, Worker
Centes, ECON. POL'Y INST. 1, http://www.cornellpress.comell.eduIresources/titles/801401009
32140/extras/Map_.Worker-Centers.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (listing locations of 137
workers' centers in the United States and listing their affiliate partners, including many
unions).
1 08. Rebecca J. Livengood, Olgamzing for Structural Change: The Potential and
Promise of Worker Centes, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE. 325, 332-33 (2013).
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Unions have appeared before the Supreme Court both to
prosecute Title VII cases and to defend against them. For example,
shortly after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unions
litigated a series of cases in which they were named as defendants
because of the discriminatory impact of union-negotiated seniority
systems.o' These cases involved not only liability issues, but also
difficult questions about how to provide remedies to workers who were
excluded from desirable jobs because seniority systems entrenched the
effects of prior (legal) discrimination."' In addition, a handful of other
Supreme Court cases arising under employment discrimination
statutes involved intentional race discrimination by labor unions."' For
example, in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v
EEOC, the local union defendant unsuccessfully fought a district
court's directive that it remedy its history of "particularly egregious"" 2
discrimination against nonwhite workers seeking admission to the
union by achieving 29% nonwhite membership and creating a fund to
be used to recruit minority participants. 3 Then, in Goodman v
Lukens Steel Co., a Steelworkers' local unsuccessfully attempted to
defend its policy of declining to process grievances raising race
discrimination or harassment based on employer opposition to such
claims.' Finally, a third case involved discrimination against white
employees: in McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., a
Teamsters local unsuccessfully argued that neither Title VII nor 42
U.S.C. § 1981 prevented employers from choosing to fire white
employees who had stolen from the company, while retaining black
employees accused of the same conduct."' However, the Teamsters'
109. Eg, E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing the propriety of a back pay remedy in a case involving a
discriminatory seniority system in which an employer and union were named as defendants).
110. Unions' positions in these cases are discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.
111. Other Supreme Court cases concerned breaches of unions' duty to represent all
bargaining unit employees fairly, which occurred when unions discriminated by refusing
minority workers entrance into the union. Eg., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975), supemseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (inferring a duty to
represent all covered employees fairly from the NLRA's exclusive representation provision in
a case involving a racially discriminatory seniority system). Because these cases arise under
labor statutes, they are beyond the scope of this Article, except to the extent that they also
raise nonlabor issues. See mfra Part II.B.5.
112. 478 U.S. 421,483 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
113. Id.at433,440,482.
114. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
115. 427 U.S. 273, 283-91 (1976).
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position was undermined by an AFL-CIO amicus brief that
successfully argued that both statutes should apply to white workers."'
Then, in United Steelworkers ofAmenca v Webe" and Johnson
v Transportation Agency,"' unions defended negotiated affirmative
action plans designed to correct "manifest imbalances" in workforce
composition."' After the Court upheld both plans, the AFL-CIO
carefully sought to preserve these holdings by distinguishing the
negotiated affirmative action plans at issue in those cases from more
ad hoc measures taken by employers in other cases.'20 For example, the
controversial"' case of Tannan v Board of Education arose when a
school district terminated a white teacher instead of a minority teacher
with identical seniority and qualifications in order to maintain racial
diversity among the teachers within Taxman's department.'22 Once the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, civil rights groups-fearing that the
Rehnquist Court would interpret Title VII so as to gut affirmative
action programs-financed most of a settlement that removed the case
from the Supreme Court docket just days before argument.'
116. Motion for Leave To File Brief & Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae,
McDonalg 427 U.S. 273 (No. 75-260), 1975 WL 173858.
117. 443U.S. 193 (1979).
118. 480U.S. 616(1987).
119. The Johnson plaintiff named only his employer in his suit, which charged that he
was passed over in favor of a female employee in violation of Title VII. However, the union,
which had agreed to the county's affirmative action plan, intervened in the case as a
defendant. Brief of Respondent SEIU Local 715 at i, 2, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-
1129), 1986 WL 728167, at *i, *2.
120. In addition, in Weber itself, the Steelworkers contrasted cases involving
government-imposed quotas to plans that were voluntarily adopted by private employers,
arguing that the legislative history of Title VII did not reveal a congressional intent to forbid
the latter. However, making that case meant showing that Congress did intend to preclude
governmental quotas. Professor Deborah Malamud has argued persuasively that this theory
was influential in achieving a win in Weber Deborah C. Malamud, United Steelworkers of
America v. Brian Weber, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 176 (Joel Wm.
Friedman ed., 2006). However, the Steelworkers' strategy threatened to alienate the union
from the civil rights community. See id. at 182-86.
121. E.g., Nat Hentoff, A Case of Spin in Piscataway, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1997,
available at 1997 WLNR 7325093. Even many years later, the case remained a flash point, as
evidenced by the fact that it was discussed in reference to the Supreme Court nominations of
both Samuel Alito, who ruled in favor of Taxman as a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Elena Kagan, who as a lawyer in the Clinton White House
had a role in shaping the administration's position on the case. The Nomhation ofElena
Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Heanag Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 818, 823-24 (2010) (testimony of Peter N.
Kirsanow); Daniel H. Pollitt, Veto Alito!, INDY WK. (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.indyweek.
com/indyweek/veto-alito/Content?oid=1 196395.
122. 91 F.3d 1547,1551 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismisse4 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
123. Leandra Lederman, Pcedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
PenmitNon-PartyInvolvementin Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 244-45 (1999);
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Apparently sharing this apprehension, the AFL-CIO devoted much of
its amicus brief to distinguishing the school district's decision to lay off
Taxman from the negotiated plans in Weber and Johnson, rather than
to defending the school district's actions.124 Thus, while the brief
implicitly criticized the school district's actions (and the brief was filed
in support of neither party),' it was evidently designed to preserve
affirmative action to the extent realistically possible, rather than to
limit it."'
Unions have also fought to expand protections against sex and
gender discrimination in employment discrimination. A leading union
in this effort, the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers (UE) inaugurated "the modem beginning of the
organized pay equity movement in this nation."'27 As part of its work
in this vein, UE filed a series of cases charging that employer-
sponsored insurance plans violated Title VII when they excluded
pregnancy from coverage,' reaching the Supreme Court in General
Electric Co. v Gilbert.'29 UE did not prevail in GilberZ but Congress
later legislatively overruled it with the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.'o However, another electrical workers' union-the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers-successfully challenged an
employer policy that required female employees to make larger
Editorial, AfFirmative Action: Sooner or Later High Court Will Have To Decide,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 6532399 ("The
prospect of an adverse ruling prompted civil rights groups to provide the major share of a
$433,500 settlement that the school board was required to pay Taxman as the result of trial
and appeals court rulings.").
124. Brief of the AFL-CIO & the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521
U.S. 1117 (1997) (No. 96-679), 1997 WL 528594, at *2.
125. Id
126. Similarly, the AFL-CIO's brief in Minnick v California Department of
Corrections both sought to distinguish Weber and Johnson and-like the state-successfully
urged the Court to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because there was not yet
a final judgment from the lower courts. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, Minnick v.
Cal. Dep't of Corr., 452 U.S. 105 (1981) (No. 79-1213), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2193.
127. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 50-51 (1994).
128. Brief of International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-
CLC, as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640), 1974
WIL 185751, at *3-4 (listing other cases challenging similar insurance policies filed by UE
and groups of woman workers and listing UE's efforts to achieve coverage for pregnancy-
related health needs at the bargaining table).
129. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), supetseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
130. Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
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contributions to a pension fund than their male counterparts."' And
the union in UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc., working with a coalition
of advocacy groups,3 2 prevailed in its challenge to an employer policy
precluding women who could become pregnant from working at jobs
involving potential lead exposure."' Unions' frequent litigation of sex
discrimination cases continues to this day.'34 In addition, unions have
filed proemployee briefs in cases involving other antidiscrimination
statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act.'35
Finally, the AFL-CIO, Change to Win, and individual labor
unions filed briefs in both United States v Whdsor and Holligsworth
v Perry, cases concerning the constitutionality of the federal Defense
131. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
132. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez & Susan P. Sturm, International Union, U.A.W v.
Johnson Controls: The History ofLitigation Alliances and Mobilation To Challenge Fetal
Protection Policies 4 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 07-145, 2007), available athttp://www.ssrn.com/abstract-982252.
133. 499 U.S. 187, 190,211 (1991).
134. See Brief of the AFL-CIO & the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
Division, International Brotherhood of Teamsters as Amicus Cuiae in Support of
Respondent, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259),
2006 WL 622124 (arguing that reassignment to a worse job was an "adverse employment
action" for purposes of a Title VII claim based on an employer's retaliation for a union-
represented employee's sexual harassment complaint); Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03-
95), 2004 WL 363887 (arguing that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in sexual
harassment cases is not available when the plaintiff has been constructively discharged); Brief
of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cudae in Support of Respondent, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90 (2003) (No. 02-679), 2003 WL 1786612; Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus
Cuiae in Support of the Respondent, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
(No. 97-569), 1998 WL 145348; Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of
Respondent, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167), 1988 WL
1025873; Brief of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union et al., as
Amici Cwiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 78.
135. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435), 2003 WL
164199 (arguing that physicians are employees for purposes of the ADA); Brief of the AFL-
CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of Respondent, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002) (No. 00-1250), 2001 WL 1023719 [hereinafter Brief of the AFL-CIO in Barnett]
(arguing that an employer-sponsored seniority plan that was not collectively bargained did not
create a vested expectation that open positions would go to the most senior employee,
meaning that an employer could be required to offer an open position to a disabled employee
as a reasonable accommodation); Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cwiae in Support of
Respondent, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (No. 00-1089),
2001 WL 1023522 (arguing that the plaintiff was covered by the ADA because she was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks); Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (No. 97-
1943), 1999 WL 86514 (arguing that individuals with impairments that can be corrected
through ameliorative measures, like eyeglasses, should nonetheless be covered by the ADA).
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of Marriage Act and the California constitutional amendment limiting
marriage to unions consisting of one man and one woman.1 6 In both
briefs, the unions and federations highlighted a list of work-related
burdens resulting from discrimination against same-sex couples."'
Turning from discrimination cases, unions also frequently litigate
cases regarding the constitutional rights of public sector employees.
These cases have arisen under the First and Fourth Amendments, as
well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), a union that
represents employees in thirty-one federal agencies,"' has been
particularly active in this area, litigating both First and Fourth
Amendment issues affecting employees of the federal government.
For example, in United States v NTE the union successfully
challenged a subsection of the Ethics in Government Act that
prohibited federal employees from accepting compensation for giving
speeches or writing articles.' That case is one of a string of cases
concerning the rights of public employees to exercise their First
Amendment rights both in and outside the workplace, many of which
featured amicus participation by the AFL-CIO and individual unions.'40
Then, in NTEU v Von Raab, the Court rejected the union's attempt to
limit drug testing of certain public employees; 4' that case was decided
on the same day as another case presenting a similar issue, brought by
unions representing railway employees.'42 These are just a few of the
136. Brief of the AFL-CIO et al. as Amid Cudae Supporting Respondent Edith
Schlain Windsor & Suggesting Affirmance, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/publications/supreme court_
preview/briefs-v2/12-307_respamcu aflcio-etal.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief of AFL-CIO &
Change to Win as Amici Cuiae Supporting Respondents & Suggesting Affirmance,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/supremescourtpreview/briefs-v2/12-144_respamcuaflcio-
ctw.authcheckdam.pdf.
137. Brief of the AFL-CIO et al. as Amici Cunae Supporting Respondent Edith
Schlain Windsor & Suggesting Affirmance, supm note 136, at 3-5 (describing higher costs
and taxes, denial of access to health care benefits, and deprivation of governmental retirement
and financial assistance as effects of discrimination against same-sex married couples); Brief
of AFL-CIO & Change to Win as Amici Clwiae Supporting Respondents & Suggesting
Affirmance, supra note 136, at 2-4 (same).
138. About NTEU NAT'L TREASURY EMPs. UNION, http://www.nteu.org/NTEU/ (last
visited Oct. 27, 2013).
139. 513 U.S. 454,457,478-80(1995).
140. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cluiae in Support of Respondent, supm note
79; Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1767122; Brief for the NTEU as Amicus Cuiae
Supporting Respondent, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1749167.
141. 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
142. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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cases about the constitutional rights of public employees in which
unions have been involved.'43
2. Political Participation and Protest
A second set of issues that unions frequently litigate concerns
their rights to speech and assembly, including participation in the
political process through protest, petitioning, and electioneering.
As discussed above, labor activists often raised First Amendment
defenses in response to early criminal prosecutions for labor-related
speech and assembly.'" While these early defenses were unsuccessful,
unions' fortunes later improved. Thus, for example, the Court first
held that the First Amendment protects picketing in Thornhill v
Alabama, in which it overturned a local union president's criminal
conviction under an antipicketing and loitering statute.'45 Thomillset
the stage for the Court's later decisions robustly protecting picketing
and other protests by other social movement groups, including civil
rights protesters.'46 Importantly, it was also the first case in which the
Court sustained a facial challenge to a statute on overbreadth
grounds,147 giving rise not only to a substantive right, but also a
powerful and far-reaching litigation strategy.1'
Likewise, cases involving labor activists were critical in the
development of the freedom of assembly. The Court first overturned a
criminal conviction based on the freedom of assembly, simultaneously
incorporating the right of assembly against the states, in De Jonge v
143. Eg., Motion for Leave To File a Brief Amici Curiae & Brief for the AFL-CIO &
for the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2, Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (No. 80-2043), 1981 WL
390274, at *2 (discussing the authority of public school officials to remove library books
from shelves); Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
709 (1959) (No. 504), 1959 WL 101670, at *34 (discussing the due process right of public
employees to challenge security clearance decisions).
144. See discussion supm Part II.A.
145. 310 U.S. 88, 104, 106 (1940).
146. Eg., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
147. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863
(1991).
148. Eg., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122 (1990) ("The overbreadth doctrine .. . is
indeed 'strong medicine....' (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)));
see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through
Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 598-601 (2009) (arguing that facial
challenges better hold legislatures accountable for unconstitutional lawmaking); David H.
Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1333, 1353-64 (2005) (discussing the




Oregon.149  De Jonge was part of a Communist Party meeting
advertised as "a protest against illegal raids on workers' halls and
homes and against the shooting of striking longshoremen by Portland
police.""'s The Court further articulated the scope of this right in two
subsequent labor cases: Hague v CIO, in which the Court established
that streets and parks were public fora, available to labor organizers
who wished to educate listeners about the virtues of the relatively new
NLRA,"' and Thomas v Collins, in which the Court overturned the
Texas conviction of UAW President R.J. Thomas for publicly soliciting
members without a permit, announcing that restrictions on First
Amendment rights must be "justified by clear public interest,
threatened . .. by clear and present danger."'52 Like freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly was soon applied to other groups,'" and the
public forum doctrine took on a life of its own in the development of
First Amendment jurisprudence.'54
In recent years, the labor movement has consistently filed amicus
briefs in support of protestors. In some instances, this has placed the
labor movement in opposition to its traditional allies. For example, in
Scheidler v National Organization for Women, Inc, the AFL-CIO
argued that the Hobbs Act should not reach certain antiabortion protest
activities, even if they involved violence or threats of violence.'
Labor's litigation of campaign finance cases has also been
controversial. In particular, labor unions and the AFL-CIO have
sometimes fought campaign finance restrictions, which have generally
149. 299 U.S. 353, 363-66 (1937).
150. Id. at 358-59; see also John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Feedom ofAssembly, 84
TuL. L. REv. 565, 599 (2010) (discussing De Jonge and the right of assembly).
151. 307 U.S. 496, 502, 515-16 (1939). The Justices in Hague did not agree on the
rationale for incorporating the First Amendment against the states-Justices Roberts, Black,
and Hughes relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, while Justice Stone rested on the
Due Process Clause, citing De Jonge, among other cases. Id. at 510-12, 518-19, 532.
152. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
153. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan rally); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (protest by black students); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) (same).
154. See generily Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Pubhc Forum Doctrine, 59
U. CIN. L. REv. 739 (1991) (discussing the development of the public forum doctrine).
155. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Scheidler
v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (Nos. 04-1244, 04-1352), 2005 WL
2148528, at *14; see also Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 2-4, Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (No. 98-1856), 1999 WL 1034471, at *2-4
(arguing that a Colorado statute, which limited antiabortion protesters from knowingly
approaching within eight feet of a person entering a medical facility in order to distribute
handbills or counsel, was a violation of the First Amendment).
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applied to corporations and unions.' For example, unions litigated
some of the earliest campaign finance cases, challenging the Taft-
Hartley Act's ban on union and corporate expenditures in connection
with federal elections.'" More recently, the AFL-CIO was one of a list
of plaintiffs (alongside such varied groups as the National Rifle
Association, the National Right to Life Committee, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), national- and state-level political parties, and
elected representatives) that challenged portions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act in McConnell v FEC"' And the AFL-
CIO filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in Citiens
United v FEC,"' along with other campaign finance cases,"'
challenging restrictions on electioneering communications."'
On voting rights cases, by contrast, unions are generally aligned
with other progressive social movement groups. Thus, for example, in
2008, labor groups were aligned with a long list of other progressive
amici on the side of petitioners challenging a state voter photo
identification requirement.62 Similarly, individual unions and the
AFL-CIO filed an anicus brief in ArLzona v Inter Tibal Council of
Arzona, Inc., arguing that federal law preempted a state requirement
that registering voters show proof of citizenship."' The brief cited the
unions' "support of nationwide activities to register eligible voters
156. I have argued elsewhere that labor unions may be better served by seeking to
uphold limits on electioneering, even if those limits cover unions themselves. See Garden,
supm note 14, at 13-14.
157. Eg., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (holding that the use of union
dues to finance an election-related television commercial violated the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act and remanding for the lower court to consider the constitutionality of the Act in
the first instance); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
158. 540 U.S.93 (2003), overrledbyCitizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
159. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cudiae in Support of Appellant, Citizens
United 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365216.
160. E.g, Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiein Support of Appellant, Wis. Right
to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-1581), 2005 WL 3076074; Motion for
Leave To File a Brief Amicus Curiae & Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, FEC v.
Nat'l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (No. 81-1506), 1982 WL 608648.
161. Electioneering communications are communications that mention a candidate by
name temporally close to an election. In particular, unions have expressed concern that
electioneering communications bans will make it difficult for unions to lobby incumbent
politicians, even if that lobbying is unrelated to an election. See Charlotte Garden, Unions
and Campaign FinanceLitigation, 14 NEv. L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
162. Eg., Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al., as
Amici Cuiae in Support of Petitioners, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181
(2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 3407030.
163. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass'n, et al., in Support of
Respondents, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (No. 12-
71), 2013 WL 457385.
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through organized voter registration programs and [removal of]
barriers to voters casting their ballots in federal, and state, elections.""
These cases offer a particularly clear illustration of how union
litigation of democracy-related cases helps shape the infrastructure in
which unions' (and other groups') other political activity occurs.
3. Structure of Government
In a series of cases concerning the structure of American
government, labor unions have argued in favor of a strong federal
government vis-A-vis the states, as well as for separation of powers
principles that insulate congressional lawmaking and Executive
Branch officials from outside political pressure.
As stated above, unions have litigated key federalism cases
regarding the FLSA's application to state government employees.
Although unions could not bring these cases under their own names,
their behind-the-scenes participation is evident."' For example, Larry
Gold argued Gawia v San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthotity on
behalf of Garcia, and the case was briefed by Gold and several other
prominent labor lawyers, including the general counsel of the union
that represented the transit authority's employees."' Plainly, it is
usually beyond the reach of city employees to hire Supreme Court
experts to represent their interests before the Supreme Court, and
furthermore, the lawyers did not recoup their fees from the transit
authority, despite the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas's observation that "[Garcia] may have been
instrumental in arguing the position which the Supreme Court
ultimately adopted."' Likewise, albeit less successfully, Gold and
other union lawyers briefed and argued two Eleventh Amendment
cases about whether state employees can subject their employers to suit
in order to enforce federal law: Alden v Maine,' another FLSA case,
164. Id at 2.
165. Matthew W Lampe & E. Michael Rossman, Procedual Appmaches for
Counteing the Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20
LAB. LAW. 311, 313-14 (2005) (suggesting that the percentage of individuals who both fall
within the putative class and consent to join the action (the "opt-in" rate) may be higher in
union-backed FLSA cases than in cases without union support).
166. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. McLaughlin, 684 F Supp. 158, 159 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) (describing Earle Putnam as "Gen. Counsel, Amalgamated Transit Union"); Reply
Brief of Appellant Joe G. Garcia on Reargument, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Nos. 82-1913, 82-1951), 1984 WL 566133.
167. McLaughln, 684 F Supp. at 163.
168. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states are immune from suit in their own
courts).
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and Kimel v Florda Board of Regents,"' an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) case.
In addition, unions have filed numerous amicus briefs in other
federalism cases involving the application of employee-protective
federal law to states."' Perhaps the most surprising of these was the
union's position in Wite v Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., a dormant commerce clause challenge to a Boston
mayoral executive order requiring that city-funded projects be staffed
by at least half Boston residents.'1 The AFL-CIO appeared in the case
on the side of the employers, along with several employer trade groups
and the Chamber of Commerce, arguing for the order to be struck
down."2  While one might have expected local unions from
surrounding localities to weigh in, the national AFL-CIO's apparent
calculation that unions had more to lose than to gain from such
requirements is striking, particularly considering the strong link
between urban density and union density'" and the relative ease of
organizing workers who live near each other, compared to workers
who are scattered throughout sprawling suburbs.
169. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the ADEA did not validly abrogate states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity). In Alden, union lawyers Timothy Belcher of the Maine
State Employees Association and Donald Fontaine signed Alden's Supreme Court brief.
Brief for Petitioners, Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (No. 98-436), 1999 WL 9767. Similarly, United
Faculty of Florida (UFF) lawyer Thomas Brooks signed Kimel's Supreme Court brief, and
Kimel himself was vice president of the Florida State University chapter of UFF. Brief for
Petitioners J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., et al., Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (Nos. 98-791, 98-796), 1999 WL
503876; Dr Daniel KImel, FLA. ST. U., http://www.physics.fsu.eduifaculty/KimelDaniel.
htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
170. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuuiae in Support of Respondents, Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 31455480; Brief of
the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of Respondent, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996 WL 585867; Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus
Ciae in Support of Respondents, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos. 91-
543, 91-558, 91-563), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 205.
171. 460 U.S. 204, 205 n.1 (1983). The local labor requirement was added to lessen
racial tensions that may have resulted from additional requirements that women and people of
color be hired.
172. Motion for Leave To File a Brief Amici Curiae & Brief for the AFL-CIO & the
Building & Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae, White, 460 U.S.
204 (No. 81-1003), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1317; Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Wite, 460 U.S. 204 (No. 81-1003), 1982 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1311; Brief Amicus Cuiae of New England Legal Foundation et al., in
Support of Respondents, White, 460 U.S. 204 (No. 81-1003), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
1316.
173. E.g., Unions and Smart Growth, GOOD JOBS FIRST (2010), http://www.goodjobs
first.org/smart-growth-working-families/unions-and-smart-growth.
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Unions have also brought key separation of powers cases. For
example, unions were among the plaintiffs in both Bowsher v Sya7
and Clinton v City ofNew York'" In both cases, unions successfully
argued that the statutes at issue-the Granim-Rudman-Hollings Act
and the Line Item Veto Act, both of which decreased federal spending,
harming governmental employees in the process-violated separation
of powers principles.' And the AFL-CIO argued in Mornson v Olson
that Congress's ability to impose "good cause" limitations on the
President's removal of Executive Branch appointees was critical "to
insulate executive officers entrusted with the responsibility of
administering a particular statutory mandate from immediate political
pressures.""' As the AFL-CIO pointed out in its brief, such limitations
also protected NLRB members, as well as members of the Federal
Trade Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and
many others.'
4. Civil Practice and Procedure
Civil procedure cases often raise social justice and court access
issues. Yet, because the underlying issue is often the one that is of
concern to the litigating union, it can be difficult to predict which side
of the issue the union will support.
Take, for example, the seminal case of Conley v Gibson, which
announced the now-defunct'" pleading requirement that a complaint
need only "set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted."'
Conley began as a duty of fair representation case in which a group of
black railway employees alleged in their complaint that their union had
failed to take any action when their employer replaced them with white
employees and had maintained segregated local unions."' In response,
the union argued for an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that would have required the employees to set out detailed
factual allegations in their complaint-a position that would have
174. 478 U.S. 714 (1986), superseded by statute, Act of July 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
366, 100 Stat. 773.
175. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
176. Id. at 420-25; id. at 449-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717-
19, 722-27.
177. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of Neither Party at 1-2,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 1031590, at *1-2.
178. Id. at 20.
179. SeeAshcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
180. 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
181. Idat42-43.
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made it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss.'
More recently, the union defendant in Devlin v Scardelletti also sought
to limit court access by precluding a class member-objector from
appealing the district court's approval of a settlement agreement in an
ERISA case.' In contrast, unions have sought to facilitate access to
the civil justice system when they or their members are plaintiffs suing
employers, as in cases discussed above, in which unions sought to
appear on behalf of their members under principles of associational
standing.184
In the amicus context, however, unions have regularly sought to
enlarge court access for plaintiffs. Thus, the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) and AFL-CIO recently argued in Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v Jackson that employees should be entitled to have
courts decide whether arbitration agreements signed as a condition of
employment are unconscionable.' Likewise, both labor federations
and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)-a frequent
Wal-Mart opponent outside of the courts"--argued in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v Dukes in favor of a relatively relaxed view of the
"commonality" requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Finally, unions have also argued against the expansion of removal
jurisdiction (and therefore in favor of plaintiffs' right to have their
cases heard in plaintiff-friendly state courts)' and requirements that
would-be appellants post bonds before proceeding with appeals."'
182. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et al. at 3-4, Conley, 355 U.S. 41 (No. 7),
1957 WL 87662, at *34.
183. 536 U.S. 1, 4 (2002) (concerning the legality of a pension plan's decision to
eliminate cost of living adjustments for covered active workers but not retirees).
184. See supm note 55 and accompanying text.
185. Brief Amicus Curiae of SEIU et al. in Support of Respondent, Rent-A-Center, W,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 1393446; see also Brief of the
AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 575625, at *1-2 (arguing that an agreement
requiring arbitration of employment discrimination disputes did not prevent the EEOC from
seeking relief on behalf of an employee).
186. See, e.g., Wahouse Workers Deliver 20,000 Signatures to Bay Area Walmart
Board Membes, UFCW (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.ufcw.org/2013/03/01/warehouse-
workers-deliver-20000-signatures-to-bay-area-walmart-board-members/ (describing UFCW
efforts to gather signatures petitioning the working conditions in Wal-Mart's supply chain).
187. Brief of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union et al. as
Amicus Cwiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 78, at 2.
188. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2-3,
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (No. 86-526), 1987 WL 880459, at *2-3.
189. Brief for the AFL-CIO & for the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, as Amici Curiae in Support of the Position of Appellee at 2-4, Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (No. 85-1798), 1986 WL 727513, at *2-4.
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In recent years, then, unions have mostly argued in favor of
expanding access to courts and counsel, and this advocacy has most
often occurred in cases of substantive importance to the labor
movement. However, because unions are also sometimes named as
defendants in lawsuits,'o they have at other times made arguments that
would limit court access for plaintiffs.
5. Community Concerns
Unions have participated in a significant number of cases raising
social justice concerns of importance to their members, as well as to
similarly situated nonmembers. For example, the AFL-CIO has
drafted amicus briefs supporting laws designed to ensure an adequate
supply of affordable housingl9' and health care'92 and to protect the
procedural due process rights of government benefits recipients.' It
has also focused on education and immigration, two examples that I
describe in more detail in the remainder of this Subpart.
Unions have participated in relatively few immigration cases
before the Supreme Court, but the cases in which they have
participated reveal an evolving relationship to immigrant communities.
The source of this ambivalence is the perceived effect of immigrant
workers on wage rates: a ready supply of workers from outside the
country can drive down wages, and further, undocumented workers are
especially vulnerable to violations of their workplace rights, meaning
190. See discussion infra Part III.A.
191. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (No. 90-1947), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 69; Brief of
the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cwiae in Support of Appellees, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1 (1988) (No. 86-753), 1987 WL 881297; Motion for Leave To File a Brief as Amici
Cwiae & Brief of the National Urban Coalition, et al., as Amici Cwiae, James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971) (No. 154), 1970 WL 122850.
192. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cwiae in Support of Petitioners Suggesting
Reversal of the Decision Below on the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue, supra note 73.
193. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 4-7, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682 (1979) (No. 77-1511), 1979 WL 199673, at *4-7 (advocating that social security
beneficiaries be entitled to request a hearing before the government begins recoupment
proceedings); Brief for the AFL-CIO, & for the Plaintiffs in Green, et al. v. Weinberger, et al.
(D.D.C. No. 2219-73) as Amici Curiae at 23, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (No.
74-204), 1975 WL 173413, at *23 (arguing that disability recipients should be entitled to a
pretermination hearing); Motion for Leave To File a Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief for the
AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 18-20, Ind. Emp't Sec. Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973)
(No. 71-1119), 1972 WL 135822, at *18-20 (arguing state law unemployment compensation
termination procedures were inadequate because of the absence of a pretermination hearing);
Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, Cal. Dep't of Human Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S.
121 (1971) (No. 507), 1971 WL 133378 (arguing the California procedure for appealing an
award of unemployment benefits impermissibly burdens the unemployed).
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that statutory protections may not be sufficient to keep wages up and
maintain improved working conditions. These tensions were on
display in Saxbe v Bustos, a 1974 case brought by the United Farm
Workers (UFW) Organizing Committee to challenge the practice of
allowing "alien commuters"-those who work in the United States but
commute back to homes in Canada or Mexico on a daily or seasonal
basis-to be treated as lawful permanent residents." The AFL-CIO's
amicus brief argued:
Commuters are a major causitive [sic] factor of the adverse situation
facing domestic workers in border areas. For example, a 1961
Department of Labor survey of Laredo and El Paso, Texas showed that
"a large number of unemployed American workers had the same
occupational skills as the employed alien commuters." In one instance
two garment firms employed 88 commuters as sewing machine
operators. At this same time, the files of the "Texas Employment
Commission contained applications from 156 unemployed American
workers with the same occupation." The survey also found that the
wages paid by firms employing only American workers were 38%
higher than those paid by firms employing alien commuters and that
"there were cases where a single firm employing both commuters and
Americans would pay the commuters less than the Americans similarly
employed."95
Similar concerns-but a more proactive and progressive vision-were
reflected in the AFL-CIO's recent amicus brief challenging Arizona's
punitive immigration law. Specifically, the federation opined that
immigration law "should include an improved employment
authorization mechanism and operational control of the border
between the United States and Mexico as well as an opportunity for
the current undocumented population to earn lawful status in the
United States."' This reflects the modern labor movement's stance
that immigrant workers who are already in the country should be
granted citizenship or permanent legal status in order to decrease
employers' leverage over these workers.'"
194. 419 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1974).
195. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 3, Saxbe, 419 U.S. 65 (Nos. 73-300,
73-480), 1974 WL 185649 (citations omitted) (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 7733, 7740 (1969)).
196. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Cuiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1054499, at *2.
197. See, e g., Exec. Office of the President, Fxing Our Broken Inmigmtion System,
WiTE HOUSE 7 (July 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/ag-rural-
report-07292013.pdf ("[F]armworkers who have been working without legal status have been
performing vital and challenging work ... while, in many cases, earning barely subsistence
wages."); Press Release, Give Us a Vote on a Path to Citizenship Now!, UNITED FARM
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Another controversial advocacy area is the legality of affirmative
action in education. Unions' advocacy in the area of race and
education goes back decades. For example, the CIO argued an
English-only education statute was unconstitutional in Stainback v Mo
Hock Ke Lok Pd" and against segregation in Brown v Board of
Education,199 and then the National Education Association argued for
strong remedies to fight school segregation in Swann v Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.2" Around the same time, unions
also argued that state educational funding mechanisms that resulted in
dramatically different per-pupil expenditures in different school
districts were unconstitutional, though that argument was rejected by
the Supreme Court without even holding argument.201
More recently, labor federations and teachers' unions have argued
that affirmative action policies in education satisfy strict scrutiny
because "opportunities for students to interact with their peers from
other races in the educational process-opportunities that are fostered
by [affirmative action] policies. . .- have substantial, positive impacts
that make them better citizens in our democracy and in the
workplace."202 This argument tracks similar arguments made by unions
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District
No. 103 and Grutter v Bollinger.20 4 However, this is not to say that
WORKERS (Aug. 14, 2013), http://ufw.org/board.php?mode-view&b code=news.press&
b_no-14267 (discussing efforts of the UFW and AFL-CIO to pressure a California
congressman "to act on immigration reform with a path to citizenship").
198. Brief of CIO, Amicus Curiae, Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368
(1949) (No. 52), 1948 WL 47231.
199. Brief for the CIO as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(No. 1), 1952 WL 47255.
200. Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Education Ass'n, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (No. 281), 1970 WL 122662 (arguing in favor
of transportation remedies to integrate the school district).
201. Brief Supporting Jurisdictional Statement for Amici Curiae AFL-CIO
International Union, UAW Western Center on Law & Poverty, Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S.
44 (1970) (No. 864), 1969 WL 120240; Motion To File Brief Supporting Jurisdictional
Statement & Brief for AFL-CIO American Federation of Teachers International Union, UAW
Western Center on Law & Poverty as Amici Curiae, Mcnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)
(No. 1033), 1969 WL 120024.
202. Brief Amicus Cuiae of the National Education Ass'n, et al., in Support of
Respondents at 1 & n.2, 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-
345) 2012 WL 3540398, at *1 & n.2, *3 (brief of the National Education Association;
twenty-seven state affiliates; the AFL-CIO; the American Federation of Teachers; the
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees; the SEIU; and the People for
the American Way Foundation).
203. Brief Amicus Cuiae of the National Education Ass'n, et al., in Support of
Respondents at 8, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927085, at *8 ("Racial classifications continue to
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labor unions and federations have always argued in favor of the legality
of affirmative action in education: one much earlier exception came in
DeFunis v Odegar4m05 where the AFL-CIO opposed (though the
National Education Association supported)206 the University of
Washington's program of affirmative action in law school
admissions-a strategy that the state attributed to the AFL-CIO's
desire to "achieve reversal of Courts of Appeals' decisions upholding
affirmative action programs in the construction trades."207
These two examples reveal shifting priorities over time, but also
highlight that the current American labor movement is generally a
strong ally of other progressive groups on issues involving race.
6. Industry-Specific Litigation
Finally, unions sometimes litigate issues of importance to the
specific industries in which unionized workers are employed. While
this is a smaller category than the others discussed herein, it
nonetheless covers a range of subjects. One particularly high profile-
if idiosyncratic-example is the Major League Baseball Players
Association's encouragement and funding of Curt Flood's failed
attempt to invalidate professional baseball's reserve system on antitrust
grounds.208 While Flood lost, his case "heightened awareness among
carry great weight in our society-dividing opportunities inequitably and distorting
perceptions with stereotypes and prejudice. Confronted with this reality, respondent school
districts decided that taking race into account in making student assignments in order to
achieve racially integrated public elementary/secondary schools would allow them to fulfill
their dual mission of instilling in all children 'the values on which our society rests,' and
providing them with the skills and knowledge necessary to realize their full potential."
(citation omitted) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,293 (1972)))).
204. Brief Amicus Curiae of AFL-CIO in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 536743, at *2 (arguing that
"the challenged policies will reduce employment discrimination" and that reducing
employment discrimination is a compelling state interest).
205. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (No. 73-235), 1974 WL 185629.
206. Brief of the National Organization for Women Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc., & the National Education Ass'n as Amici Cwruiae, DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312 (No. 73-235),
1974 WL 185631.
207. Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Briefs of the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith & the AFL-CIO at 4, DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312 (No. 73-
235), 1974 WL 185628, at *4.
208. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); THE COOPERSTWN SYMPOSIUM ON
BASEBALL AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 2007-2008, at 194 (William M. Simons ed., 2009).
Additionally, had Flood recovered damages as a result of his antitrust suit, the money would
have gone to the union. Stephen H. Norwood, Baseballk Forgotten Man: Curt Flood and the
Tmansformation ofAmeican Sport, 37 REvs. AM. His. 433,436 (2009).
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his fellow players to the point that they too were willing to fight over
the issue" and helped lead owners to agree to a system of grievance
arbitration.20'
Similarly unusual from the perspective of the labor movement as
a whole was the involvement of National Writers Union then-president
Jonathan Tasini"' in a case in which the Court rejected publishers'
claims that they could reprint articles in databases without the
permission of their freelance authors.21' Before that, the journalist
involved in Battnick v Vopper also won his case,' though there, the
union was on the other side; the BartnicA Court held that the First
Amendment protected the disclosure of an illegally recorded union
negotiator's phone call, a copy of which had been anonymously
delivered to Vopper, a radio commentator."
Unions also litigate issues that affect the viability of the industries
in which they operate, such as regulatory or trade issues. 214 This type
of litigation yields great potential for collaboration (and conflict) with
other social movements and within the union movement itself. For
example, in Department of Transportation v Public Citizen, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters and environmental groups
jointly sought to compel the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) to evaluate and regulate the impact of cross-
border operations of Mexico-domiciled trucking companies under the
National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act.21 1 While the
Teamsters may well care genuinely about environmental issues,21 ' it
209. James R. Devine, Cart Flood and a Tnumph of the Show Me Spit 77 Mo. L.
REV 9, 36 (2012).
210. Steven Zeitchik, Tasini Will Leave National Witers Union, PUBLISHERS WKLY.
(Feb. 18, 2003), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/print/20030217/26678-tasini-will-
leave-national-writers-union.html.
211. N.Y Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,487-88 (2001).
212. 532 U.S. 514, 533-35 (2001).
213. Id. at 535.
214. Eg., Air Courier Conference ofAm. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517,
519 (1991) (determining whether a union had standing to challenge the Postal Service's
decision to allow private couriers to engage in international remailing).
215. 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004). That suit challenged a pilot program commenced by
FMCSA under President George W Bush, which was subsequently ended.
216. In a recent press release addressing the same issue, Teamsters President Jim Hoffa
observed, "FMSCA [sic] is recklessly ignoring the true environmental impact Mexican trucks
will have if permitted to travel without restrictions throughout our country." Teamsters,
Sierm Club: FMCSA Fails To Pmtect Environment from Mexican Trucks, TEAMSTERS (Aug.
15, 2011), http://www.teamster.org/content/teamsters-sierra-club-fmcsa-fails-protect-environ
ment-mexican-trucks. Likewise, the California Teamsters vocally opposed an energy
industry-backed proposal to delay enforcement of the Global Warming Solutions Act.
Margot Roosevelt, Global Warming Ballot Initiative: Teamstems and Cities Weig I, L.A.
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would strain credibility to suggest that the union was not also
considering the effects of increased competition and resulting
downward pressure on wages that would occur if Mexican-domiciled
trucking companies could compete freely with U.S.-based
companies.2"
This Part has outlined several categories of cases in which labor
unions have litigated in the Supreme Court. In the following Part, I
will turn to the various substantive positions that unions take in these
cases. In particular, I will explore characteristics of labor unions that
might cause them to support particular substantive positions in
litigation that are either similar to or divergent from other institutional
litigants.
III. UNIONS' PERSPECTIVES IN LITIGATION
Ourlabor unions ar notnarme self-seeknggroups.1
It goes nearly without saying that parties and attorneys are not
interchangeable-the identities of each have tremendous influence on
the direction a case takes. 219  Under the American adversarial style of
litigation, parties and attorneys constantly make substantive and
procedural choices that control a case's direction.220 Parties will decide
TIMs (Apr. 23, 2010, 12:14 PM), http://1atimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/04/
global-warming-ballot-initiative-california-ab-32.html.
217. In news coverage of the Teamsters' opposition to FMCSA's decision to allow
Mexican-domiciled trucking companies to operate in the United States, the Teamsters couch
their concerns in a variety of ways-that trucks from Mexico adhere to less stringent safety
standards, that they might pose a national security threat due to concerns about terrorism or
drugs smuggling, and that they might lower wages for American truck drivers. Eg., Paul J.
Nyden, Teamsters Oppose New Border Crossing Standards for Mexican Tuckers,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201203100075.
However, other regulatory issues divide labor unions from other social movement groups or
even cause internal rifts within the labor movement. These divides can occur when labor's
broader social justice goals stand in tension with unions' traditional concerns, such as
maximizing employment for union members. Thus, for example, when President Barack
Obama blocked construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, construction unions reacted
negatively, while several other large unions including the SEIU, the UAW, the Steelworkers,
and the Communications Workers of America backed President Obama's decision alongside
environmental groups. Darren Goode, Keystone Pipeline Sparks Labor Civ War, POLMCO
(Jan. 20, 2012, 2:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71733.html.
218. Senator John F Kennedy, Speech at Cadillac Square, Detroit, Michigan (Sept. 5,
1960), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=60408.
219. Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinick Place i the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REv.
137, 140 (2013) ("[I]t stands to reason that if the quality and experience of lawyers matter
everywhere else, they ought to matter in the Supreme Court as well.").
220. Justin Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 38 (2012)
(stating that in an adversarial system, "permitting parties to control the contours of their cases
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whether to litigate at all and what substantive goals to pursue; they will
also make certain decisions about litigation strategy. At a more
granular level, attorneys decide to articulate arguments in particular
ways, to advance or downplay particular legal theories, and even to cite
certain cases. And when an advocacy organization or union
participates in a case, it will undoubtedly attempt to make these
decisions so as best to advance the group's cause:221 to win the case,
but also to win via a decision written in a way that best protects the
group's larger interests.222
These dynamics, coupled with the extent of unions' participation
in a wide range of non-labor law cases, raise questions about what
factors shape unions' litigation positions. This Part begins to answer
those questions by exploring three factors that appear to have
influenced unions' positions in particular cases.
A. Unions a Plabdffs and Defendants
"Which side are you on?'23
In recent decades, labor unions and federations have increasingly
modeled themselves as members of a social justice-oriented
movement, rather than as a collection of economic actors dedicated to
serves a legitimizing function, creating an impression of fairness that may lead to societal
acceptance of court judgments").
221. For example, in his important article Servig Two Masters. Integmtion Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litgation, Derrick Bell argued that some NAACP
LDF attorneys prioritized the views of clients who favored busing as a remedy in school
desegregation cases over clients who favored other strategies for improving their children's
education, such as winning increased funding for their existing schools. Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Servig Two Masters. Integmtion Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litgation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). Undoubtedly, one could make a similar argument with
respect to other impact litigators. Accordingly, the purpose of this Part is not to suggest that
litigants other than unions might bring a more "neutral" perspective to litigation. Rather, it is
to explore the particular lenses through which labor unions might view their non-labor law
cases.
222. Many of these decisions occur once a case has reached the Supreme Court. But
there are also antecedent decisions that can affect the likelihood of a case reaching the
Supreme Court in the first place. For example, by paying for others' litigation, unions have
direct influence over what cases are brought, and the existence of free representation can
alleviate pressure to settle attributable to mounting litigation costs, allowing a party to litigate
a case to judgment or to pursue an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
223. "This line is said to come from a song written by Florence Reese in support of a
miners strike in 1932. The song goes: 'They say in Harlan County, there ain't no neutrals
there, you'll either be a union man, or a thug for J.H. Blair. Which side are you on? Which
side are you on?' Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Government in Regulating the Workplace,
13 LAB. LAw. 1, 5 n.30 (1997).
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achieving financial rewards for members.224 This move away from
"bread and butter" unionism is reflected in labor's growing invocation
of social justice issues during organizing campaigns.2 2 5 But when
unions go to court, do they litigate like social movements, or are
employers the better analogy? And what barriers face unions seeking
to achieve social justice-oriented change through litigation? 26
One key difference between unions and other social movement
litigators is the greater likelihood that a union will be dragged into
court against its will as a defendant. In this Subpart, I first explore the
structural reasons for this difference and then turn to some of its likely
effects.
Social movement organizations are today rarely hailed into court
as defendants. While it is not inconceivable that groups like the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal
Defense Fund (NAACP LDF), the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), or Public Citizen could be sued-for example, a business
that has come in for criticism could file a defamation case,227 or a
mistreated employee could bring suit under Title VII-such cases are
relatively uncommon.228 Further, to the extent lawsuits against these
groups arise directly out of the groups' core advocacy efforts, as when
a target of protest resorts to the courts for relief, the lawsuit might
galvanize the group's own constituency.29
224. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labork Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REv 1767,
1784-85 (2001) (describing the AFL-CIO's shift, during the mid-1990s, from business
unionism to social justice movement unionism).
225. Id. at 1785.
226. There is some question whether litigation "meets the definition of a social
movement activity." Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Ligation as a Social Movement
Stmtegy, 96 IOwA L. REv. BULL. 61, 76 (2011) (describing the skepticism that some scholars
express toward this view). However, that question is beyond the scope of this Article; I treat
litigation pursued by social movement groups as social movement activity.
227. See, eg., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)
(suing a consumer group for defamation due to an unfavorable product review); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (suing a civil rights group for defamation due to a
newspaper advertisement).
228. These examples should be differentiated from those in which a social movement
group deliberately engages in conduct designed to elicit a lawsuit. For example, when the
Thomas More Law Center "searched for a school district willing to adopt an alternative
curriculum [that taught "intelligent design" theories], knowing it would lead to litigation," it
was choosing the case that it would litigate just as much as if it were drafting and filing a
complaint. Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOwA L. REv. 941, 979 (2011).
229. TAYLOR BRANCH, PLLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at 44
(1998) ("[New York Times Co. v Sulivan] fostered emergency coalitions [between civil
rights leaders and] precisely those groups most needed for the civil rights movement: labor
unions, religious groups, press outlets, large corporations-anyone who could imagine being
victimized by parochial politics or a runaway jury.").
23 1
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Instead, many of the cases in which these groups participate are
those that they have affirmatively chosen and often even designed
from the ground up.230 Consider Public Citizen founder Ralph Nader's
characterization of a "public interest lawyer" as "a lawyer without
clients," one "whose goal would be ... advancing the public good."23'
To be sure, Article III's "case or controversy" requirement232 means
Nader's public interest lawyer does not operate literally without clients.
However, the lawyer can decide, in consultation with other
professional advocates and subject matter experts, to target a particular
issue and then set about locating an appropriate and willing client.
Once located, the client would direct at least some aspects of the
litigation,3 with clients who are themselves advocacy groups or
subject matter experts likely playing a more significant role.234
However, the initial decision to bring the case would have been driven
by movement goals, and a lawyer working in the Ralph Nader model
would refuse to file a proposed lawsuit that seemed to carry significant
potential downsides. This does not mean that a refused potential client
will be unable to find another attorney to file a complaint, but the
advocacy group will have preserved its name, credibility, and
resources for a preferred case.
In contrast, unions are frequent defendants. Unions may be sued
for failing to discharge the duty of fair representation that they owe to
members33 or for violating the statutory rights of members or their
230. The NAACP LDF's school desegregation campaign is probably the paradigmatic
example of controlled and disciplined litigation strategy designed by movement lawyers.
MARK V TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1936-1961 (1994). This is not to say that the NAACP was the only organization to
attempt to pursue a detailed litigation plan in pursuit of social change. For example, one
feminist campaigner recommended the development of a litigation strategy "to litigate
women's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,' which "sought to emulate the success of
organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in winning rights through organized
litigation." See, e g., Serena Mayeri, Consttutional Choices: Legal Femhnism and the
Histoncal Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 763-64 (2004). However,
disagreement between factions of the women's movement about whether to pursue a
Fourteenth Amendment-based litigation strategy, passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, or
both persisted for decades. Id at 756-69.
231. Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Acdvism i Prgressive Lawyerng Theory, 16
CLINICAL L. REv. 109, 150 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting DIANA KLEBANOW &
FRANKLIN L. JONAS, PEOPLE'S LAWYERS: CRUSADERS FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 418
(2003)).
232. U.S. CONsT. art. m, § 2.
233. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013); cf Bell, supra note 221
(discussing the impact of clients' views on litigation strategies on school desegregation).
234. Eg., Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004); Train v. Colo. Pub.
Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
235. Eg., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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own employees.' Likewise, they are often sued by employers,
government entities, and even other unions on a variety of theories.
This litigation can create precedent on issues that the union would not
have affirmatively chosen to pursue and that sometimes call for
litigation positions that advance a union's chances in court, even if it
would otherwise reject those positions outside of litigation. Avoiding
this conundrum means weakening one's litigation position-the
disadvantages of which are obvious-or settling.' Settlement bears
its own risks, though, including the possibility of demonstrating to
other potential plaintiffs that filing a complaint will result in early
capitulation.
An array of reasons accounts for this difference between unions
and other social movement litigators. First, there is the likelihood of
bad publicity associated with suing a venerated social movement
group, along with the possibility that the complaint will be dismissed
(and attorneys' fees assessed) under an anti-SLAPP statute.' Second,
various legal principles protect advocacy groups from liability arising
from their work.' Third, social movement groups other than labor
unions do not owe their members a statutory duty of fair
representation, and they are not statutorily required to choose their
leadership democratically. Relatedly, when a majority of employees in
a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, the union becomes
236. Eg., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989).
237. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Ligadon Process: The
Pamdox of Losing by Wng, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 869, 877 (1999) (noting that in the
context of Family and Medical Leave Act cases, repeat employer players may choose to
"settle cases they expect to lose and litigate those they expect to win" in order to cultivate
desirable precedent).
One recent example in which a union attempted to force a settlement in order to avoid
adverse Supreme Court precedent came in Knox v SEXL Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277
(2012). In that case, the local union defendant attempted-unsuccessfully-to moot the case
by giving the plaintiff everything that it could have achieved through continued litigation. Id
at 2287-88. However, it took this step too late-after the case had already reached the merits
stage in the Supreme Court. Counsel for the local union stated at oral argument that the move
was taken because "the officers of the union . . . thought about the situation and came to the
realization that they have no stake in the procedures that are at issue here." Transcript of Oral
Argument at 26, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 10-1121).
238. See Shannon Hartzler, Note, Pmtecting Informed Public Paricipadon: And-
SLAPP Law and the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1235, 1242 (2007) ("Common
features of anti-SLAPP laws include a mechanism for early procedural review and a
mandatory award of attorney's fees for a party whose motion to dismiss under the statute is
successful.").
239. Eg, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that the
First Amendment protects secondary consumer boycotts by civil rights groups); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the NAACP was entitled to
keep its membership list confidential).
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the bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit,2 40
including those employees who do not want the representation. These
employees may be particularly unlikely to give the union the "benefit
of the doubt" when it comes to deciding whether to sue. Fourth, there
is the sheer number and size of labor unions to consider-there are
simply more opportunities for litigation. Finally, labor unions are
involved in their members' lives in a far more direct way than most
advocacy groups, in that they are partially responsible for setting the
terms and conditions of their members' employment. Thus, whereas
disappointment in the actions of a group like the ACLU may lead to
membership resignation, disappointment with one's union is more
likely to lead to litigation.
Significantly, then, labor unions have less control than other
social movement litigators over the cases in which they become
involved. Moreover, at any given time, two unions litigating different
cases may take opposing litigation positions on an issue. For example,
in the employment discrimination context, unions or union-funded
attorneys often prosecute suits alleging employer discrimination; but at
the same time, unions are sometimes named as defendants in
discrimination cases. By the time a case has reached the courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court, international unions and labor
federations can play a larger role in attempting to rationalize litigation
positions (such as by urging settlement), but the earlier litigation
cannot be erased, potentially undermining union credibility. This may
be so particularly in a context like employment discrimination, where
historical incidents of serious race discrimination by the labor
movement are well-known.24
However, just as the control exercised by other movements over
litigation strategy should not be exaggerated, the extent to which
unions' choice of litigation vehicle is constrained by exigency and
circumstance should not be overstated. In at least some instances,
unions, like other social movement groups, plan litigation from the
ground up. In fact, Michael Gottesman, describing his early years in
practice as a labor lawyer, suggests that was a regular occurrence at his
firm:
240. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006). In about half of states, this influence extends to the
authority to require that even the unwilling pay fees to the union. Even in "right to work"
states, labor unions bargain and process grievances on behalf of the unwilling.
241. Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, "So Closely Intertwined": Labor and Racial
Solidanty, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135, 1161-63 (2013).
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We had a mandate from our clients to [shape the law so that it would
benefit the labor movement], and thus did not have to compromise the
long view for immediate tactical victories. Ideas percolated that could
not be deployed in the case under discussion, but they would be "filed
away," to be invoked in future cases that came down the pipeline-cases
that we would then be on the lookout to find.242
For example, take UAW v Johnson Controls. There, union lawyers
framed and filed a complaint243 challenging the employer's "fetal
protection policy," which excluded women who were pregnant or
capable of becoming pregnant from jobs that involved exposure to
lead.2" The union not only brought the case, but also ensured that it
was the first named plaintiff, so that its participation would be evident
to anyone looking at the case caption. Among the other named
plaintiffs were both male and female employees-women who had
been excluded from well-paying jobs under the employer's policy or
had undergone sterilization to avoid such exclusion, and men who had
been denied transfers to other departments, which they requested in
order to avoid lead exposure because of threats to their own
reproductive health.245 The class definition included "'all past, present
and future production and maintenance employees' in United Auto
Workers bargaining units at nine of Johnson Controls' plants 'who
have been and continue to be affected by [the employer's] Fetal
Protection Policy implemented in 1982."'246 This class definition,
along with the selection of the named plaintiffs, made clear to the
courts that the issue was important to both male and female workers.
Additionally, it also had potential to build solidarity among bargaining
unit members by showing why the employer's policy was not simply a
"women's issue."
Even when they are named as defendants-and thus dragged into
court unwillingly-unions can sometimes nonetheless shape a
litigation strategy that pursues labor movement goals beyond just
winning in court. This may be easy to do when the plaintiff is a
traditional adversary of labor-an employer, for instance, whose
behavior can provide a flash point for advocacy in and out of court.
Far more challenging are cases in which unions are sued by bargaining
242. Gottesman, supm note 93, at 267.
243. Marcelo L. Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection and UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.: Job Openings for Barren Women Only, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 843, 843-44 (1990).
244. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,192 (1991).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 192-93 (quoting UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310
(E.D. Wis. 1988) (alteration in original)).
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unit members. Take, for example, Internadonal Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 790 v Robbins & Myers,
Inc., in which Dortha Guy, a black employee, sued her employer and
union for racial discrimination after she was fired.247 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed the case
on timeliness grounds,248 refusing to toll the time in which Guy was
required to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) while the union grievance proceeding was
pending.249 After Guy's loss in the district court, she and the union
evidently managed to resolve their differences, because the union
switched sides to appeal the timeliness issue alongside Guy in a
parallel case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
both appeals, consolidating them for argument. Before the Supreme
Court, union lawyer Winn Newman250 and NAACP lawyers
representing Guy"' successfully convinced all nine Justices that an
amendment to Title VII that provided a longer time to file a charge
with the EEOC applied retroactively.252 Thus, the union was able to
turn a case that began in a defensive posture into an opportunity to
advocate for stronger federal court remedies for workers.
Finally, unions and labor federations sometimes signal through
their amicus advocacy that positions taken by individual unions are not
representative of the views of the larger labor movement. For
example, in McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the AFL-
CIO flatly disagreed with both positions taken by the defendant-
respondent local union. Whereas that union argued that white
employees were not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and that Title VII
does not protect employees who are accused of stealing from their
employers,253 the AFL-CIO argued the opposite.254 Less obvious was
247. 429 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). Guy alleged she was fired because of her race and that
the union then failed to represent her adequately in the grievance process. Guy v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., No. C-74-165, 1974 WL 212, at *1 (WD. Tenn. May 30, 1974), affit 525 F.2d
124 (6th Cir. 1975), revUsubnom. 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
248. Robbins& Myes, 429 U.S. at 232-33.
249. Guy, 1974 WL 212, at *3.
250. Robbns & Myers, 429 U.S. at 230 (listing counsel). Winn Newman has been
called the "grandfather" of pay equity litigation. McCANN, supre note 127, at 61.
251. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (No. 75-1264), 1976
WL 194370 (listing counsel).
252. Robbns& Myers, 429 U.S. at 241.
253. Brief of Respondent, Local No. 988, Teamsters, Freight, Tank Line & Automobile
Industry Employees at 6, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (No.
75-260), 1976 WL 181740, at *6.
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Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'InternadonalAss'n v EEOC in
which the AFL-CIO simply remained silent-a stance that itself
suggests disagreement, given how rarely the AFL-CIO fails to file an
amicus brief in support of a labor union litigant in the Supreme
Court.255
Thus, although labor unions enjoy somewhat less ability to shape
their litigation agendas than do other social movement groups, labor
unions still successfully pursue strategies to bring their litigation
strategies in particular cases into line with the larger interests of
workers.
B. Labor Solidariy and the Possibility ofDividedLoyalties
'An injury to one is an mjury to al., "
In this Subpart, I explore how the fact that labor unions are
subject to majority rule-they are elected and then face the threat of
decertification by their members, and their officers are subject to
regular elections25 7-- might affect the positions they take in court. In
other words, given that litigation usually involves winners and losers,
how can unions seek to preserve solidarity if union members are
divided? And how do unions navigate members' divergent views
when shaping their own stances before the Supreme Court?
There are at least four possible approaches available to a union or
federation facing such a scenario. First, it might try to avoid any
litigation that might divide members. Second, it might simply adopt
the position taken by, or in the apparent interest of, a majority of
represented workers. Third, it might try to find a "third way" solution
that protects the interests of all union members, and instead imposes
254. Motion for Leave To File Brief & Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, supm
note 116, at 5-6.
255. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). However, two local unions, each of whom was "presently
involved in litigation concerning the legitimacy of court-ordered or governmentally imposed
racial quotas in the employment context" filed a shared amicus brief in support of Local 28.
Brief of Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers & Local 36, International
Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Local28, 478
U.S. 421 (Nos. 84-1656, 84-1999), 1985 WL 670076, at *1. In the next Subpart, I discuss
another situation in which the AFL-CIO may not participate in Supreme Court litigation
involving unions: cases in which union members are among both the plaintiffs and the
defendants. However, that was not the situation in Local28.
256. This is an old Knights of Labor saying. Eric Tucker, Whok Running the Road?
Street Railway Stnkes and the Problem of Constructng a Liberal Capitalist Order in Canada,
1886-1914,35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 451, 455 (2010).
257. 29 U.S.C. §481(a) (2006) ("Every ... labor organization ... shall elect its
officers not less often than once every five years either by secret ballot among the members
in good standing or at a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot.").
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costs on outsiders, like employers or unrepresented workers. And
fourth, it might adopt a position in the interest of a minority of
represented workers, either after persuading the rest of the membership
or by simply ignoring their views and instead allowing union lawyers
or officers to shape litigation positions. In fact, unions' and
federations' record before the Supreme Court reveals examples of each
of these strategies at work.
As discussed in the preceding Subpart, unions cannot always
avoid unwanted litigation. However, where litigation is optional-for
example, amicus practice-unions and federations sometimes simply
avoid taking positions in cases involving union members on each side,
even where a union is inextricably linked to the facts of the case. This
occurred in Ricci v DeStefano, a case challenging New Haven
officials' decision to disregard the racially skewed results of a test that
was to be used to determine which firefighters would be promoted to
lieutenant and captain.' All the test takers were represented by the
International Association of Firefighters Local 825,2" and the
weighting of the test-which both an expert and representatives of a
black firefighters' association said could have produced an adverse
impactf"-was negotiated by the union and mandated by a collective
bargaining agreement.26 Furthermore, the local union had supported
the white test takers who wanted to have the test results certified by
filing a lawsuit of its own against the city.262 (That suit was later
dismissed in light of the district court's concerns about the union's
ability to litigate on behalf of its members, given that "the interests of a
significant subset of the Union's members are diametrically opposed to
the interests of another significant subset.")... In light of all this, the
fact that neither the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF)
nor the AFL-CIO, of which IAFF is an affiliate, filed a Supreme Court
amicus brief creates the inescapable appearance that these bodies
258. 557 U.S. 557, 561-63 (2009).
259. Michael Z. Green, Readng Ricci and Pyett To Provide Racial Justice Through
Union Arbitradon, 87 IND. L.J. 367, 400 (2012).
260. Respondents' Brief on the Merits at 7-8, Ricci 557 U.S. 557 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-
328), 2009 WL 740763, at *7-8.
261. Id. at 2.
262. New Haven Firefighters Local 825 v. City of New Haven, No. Civ.3:04CV
1169(MRK), 2005 WL 3531465 (D. Conn. Dec. 22,2005).
263. Id. at *2.4 (denying the union's associational standing because of the need for
individual firefighters to participate in the litigation, in light of the conflict between union
members).
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simply concluded that silence was preferable to taking a position that
might appear to favor one group of union members over another.2 64
A closely related strategy was pursued by the union in East Texas
Motor Freight System, Inc. v Rotnez265 There, East Texas Motor
Freight and its employees' representative, Teamsters Local 657, were
both sued by truck drivers of Mexican ancestry who were
disadvantaged by collectively bargained seniority rules that made it
difficult for "city drivers" to transfer to better-paid "line driver"
positions.266 As a named defendant, the union argued that it simply had
no ability to change the seniority provisions:
The reply of Petitioner Local 657 is that it is not responsible for the
hiring practices of the employers, and that in the applicable collective
bargaining proceedings, it has followed the instructions of its affected
membership relative to the negotiation of their contractual rights to
seniority and transfer between jobs ....
This Petitioner also says that it cannot singularly make changes in
National and Regional collective bargaining agreements that would
affect other local unions and their members, because multi-employer,
multi-union agreements, as regulated by the National Labor Relations
Act, require the concurrence of the employer and other local unions
involved... .26
That union's decision to undertake the legal equivalent of throwing up
its hands stands in contrast to far more proactive efforts undertaken by
other unions to manage potential rank-and-file disagreement about
litigation positions, including in cases involving discrimination and
seniority systems. Before discussing these union strategies, it is useful
first to describe briefly the operation of union-negotiated seniority
systems and explain why they have the potential to divide union
members.
264. There were, however, other labor voices in the case; associations of African
American and Hispanic firefighters filed briefs supporting New Haven, and other groups of
firefighters and an association of police unions filed briefs in support of the white
firefighters. Amicus Curiae Brief of Bridgeport Firefighters for Merit Employment, Inc. in
Support of Petitioners, Ricc, 557 U.S. 557 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 526198;
Amicus Brief of the Concerned American Firefighters Ass'n, Philadelphia Chapter, in
Support of Petitioners, Ricci, 557 U.S. 557 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 507010; Brief
of the National Ass'n of Police Organizations as Amici Cwiae in Support of Petitioners,
Ricci, 557 U.S. 557 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 2809358.
265. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
266. Id. at 397-98.
267. Brief for the Petitioner Teamsters Local Union 657 at 3-4, Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395 (No. 75-651), 1976 WL 194248, at *3-4 (citations omitted).
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Negotiated seniority protections are generally facially neutral and
constructed without discriminatory intent.268 These systems can govern
competitive seniority-which "determines priorities for job security,
promotion, transfer, prerogative in scheduling, training opportunities
and 'entitlement[] to ... scarce benefits among competing
employees "'-and benefits seniority, which determines "entitlement to
certain types of fringe benefits without regard to the status of other
employees."269
Even well-intentioned systems of competitive seniority can serve
to reinforce discriminatory hiring and promotion decisions by making
it impossible for discrimination victims to "catch up" to employees
hired or promoted before them 27 0-that is, unless a court orders
retroactive competitive seniority. In such a scenario, then, unions
represent (in bargaining) both discrimination victims who are morally
and legally entitled to make-whole remedies and the workers who will
be displaced even if they played no active role in (or did not even know
about) the earlier discrimination and who will feel that they have a
vested right to their existing working conditions. Complicating the
picture, unions have a strong interest in protecting the integrity of hard-
won seniority systems, which provide valuable protections for union
members who have invested much in their workplaces and who
command relatively high wages because of their many years of
service. 271' And the most senior workers will often be the most
influential within their unions,272 with less senior workers most likely to
268. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters at 27-28,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (Nos. 75-636, 75-672), 1976
WL 181352, at *27-28 (describing the development of the seniority system at issue in that
case). Many seniority systems qualify for the Civil Rights Act's carve out for "bona fide
seniority or merit system[s]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .").
269. Michael J. Zimmer, Title Vl1 Treatment ofSeniority Systems, 64 MARQ. L. REv.
79, 80 (1980) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976)).
270. Martha R. Mahoney, Whath Lef of Solidarity? Refections on Law Race, and
Labor History, 57 BuFF. L. REv. 1515, 1571 (2009) ("When race discrimination at work
became illegal in the 1960s, the previous legal regime had left minority workers with
disproportionately low seniority and union leadership disproportionately white.").
271. See Zimmer, supra note 269, at 80 ("Labor has been the strongest proponent of
seniority.").
272. Daniel J. Gifford, Redeinng the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. RE.
1379, 1380 (1988) ("Because [the most senior] workers tend to form the core of union
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be disadvantaged in the event of seniority integration.273 Thus, the
most influential members of a bargaining unit may feel that they have
a less personal stake in the effect of discrimination remedies, but also
be very committed to the seniority system for other reasons.
As a result, unions that seek both to promote nondiscriminatory
workplaces and preserve seniority protections face a conflict in the
event of an allegation of systemic discrimination. Despite this, unions
have generally argued that Title VII remedies should include make-
whole seniority, though they have also argued for limits on who is
eligible for this remedy.274 For example, in Fanks v Bowman
Transportation Co.,275 in which the Court held that Title VII called for
retroactive seniority to be awarded to black truck drivers who had been
refused line driver jobs, the Steelworkers union representing the
employees took the position that drivers who could prove they had
been discriminated against (but not those who could not) were entitled
to a make-whole remedy of retroactive seniority.276 In so arguing, the
union forcefully made the case for the importance of seniority, arguing
that an employee hired in 1972 instead of 1970 would have an
"inferior" career involving fewer fringe benefits (such as vacation days
and insurance benefits), less protection from layoffs, fewer
promotional opportunities, and less entitlement to desired shifts or
particular vacation dates."' The union also argued that a make-whole
retroactive seniority remedy existed in other contexts, such as when
employees were laid off in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.27 Thus, the union framed its argument in terms of the
integrity of union values that benefitted all union members, implicitly
making the case that an illegitimate seniority system-one that was
infected with race discrimination-was a weak seniority system.
membership, union bargaining objectives tend to weight their interests inordinately high vis-
A-vis the interests of less senior union members or labor interests as a whole.").
273. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1964) ("[Competitive status]
[s]eniority [is] of overriding importance, and one of its major functions is to determine who
gets or who keeps an available job.").
274. E.g, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1982) (noting the
union argument that a make-whole remedy was available to only 30 employees and that the
claims of about 400 other employees were time-barred).
275. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
276. Brief for Respondent United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, & for AFL-
CIO, as Amicus Curiae at 7, Fmanks, 424 U.S. 747 (No. 74-728), 1975 WL 173441, at *7.
The union distinguished these drivers from those seeking "preferential" relief, which would
have benefitted plaintiffs who had not been personally discriminated against, arguing that
Congress intended to permit only the former. Id.
277. Id. at 24-26.
278. Id. at 26.
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The Steelworkers union was not the only union that participated
in Fmanks. UAW Local 862, which was then a party to other Title VII
cases, including one in which a petition for certiorari was pending,279
filed an amicus brief that pursued a different strategy designed to
reconcile the competing concerns of discrimination victims and union
members who stood to lose relative seniority.2 80 The UAW began by
characterizing the interests of both groups of workers as legitimate and
understandable: the workers who had benefitted from the seniority
system were "blameless citizens" who, like "wronged minorit[ies],"
had "fair seniority claims."28' In making that claim, the UAW focused
on the fact that the employer, rather than the employees, had the
discriminatory intent, arguing, "[T]he incumbent employees are in no
way at fault for the employer's Title VII violation."282 The UAW had
good cause to be concerned about the effect of possible layoffs
following seniority integration-the national unemployment rate
reached 9% the year Fmnks was decided,283 and the auto industry had
been hit especially hard. The first three months of 1975 saw 300,000
permanent or temporary layoffs in the auto industry,284 representing
40% of the industry's production workforce.285
The UAW's proposed solution avoided pitting discrimination
victims against workers who had unwittingly benefitted from
discrimination by forcing employers to either keep both groups or else
provide "front pay" to laid-off workers. That plan, which the UAW
called the "front-pay save-harmless" remedy, would "require[] the
wrongdoing employer to hold [incumbent workers and newly hired
discriminatees] harmless from layoff losses in work reduction
situations."286  More specifically, the UAW proposed that "following
reinstatement of discriminatees the offending employer hold harmless
against layoff losses both the discriminatees and [an equal number of]
279. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Local 862 v. Ford Motor Co., 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
280. Motion for Leave To File Brief for Local 862, UAW, as Amicus Curiae Out of
Time & Brief Amicus Curiae, Franks, 424 U.S. 747 (No. 74-728), 1975 WL 173444.
28 1. Id. at 3.
282. Id at 4.
283. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ciilian Unemployment Rate, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
(last updated Nov. 8, 2013, 8:06 AM), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/UNRATE.txt.
284. Guy Darst, Auto IndustryLayoffs Increase, DAY, May 16, 1980, at 40.
285. New Ford Layoffs Jolt Auto Industry, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 20, 1974, at 6
(describing American auto companies' intention to lay off 300,000 workers in January 1975,
representing "more than 40% of the auto industry's 690,000 blue collar workforce," with
149,000 of those workers on "indefinite layoff").
286. Motion for Leave To File Brief for Local 862, UAW, as Amicus Curiae Out of
Time & Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 280, at 2-3.
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his incumbent employees hired between the discriminatees' original
rejection and their ultimate hiring."287 The UAW devoted the remainder
of its brief to explaining why the impact of the "front-pay save-
harmless" scheme on employers would be relatively small, showing
that in other contexts employers had found productive uses for workers
whom they were required to pay regardless.288
The benefits to unions and unionized workers of such a scheme
are plain. For union leadership, the adoption of the plan would mean
that the union could put its full weight into fighting employment
discrimination without facing opposition from members fearing for
their own jobs. This would be of particular importance in industries
enduring economic difficulties, where minority employees are often
especially vulnerable to layoffs.289 The scheme would also enlarge the
ranks of union membership, increasing the union's power and
influence within the company.
Additionally, the union may have been able to leverage the
position it had taken in court-that the company owed benefits to both
the job applicants against whom they had discriminated and incumbent
employees-into increased solidarity between those two groups.290 In
287. Id at 4. The UAW explained its proposal in an elaborate hypothetical involving
the facts of another case to which it was a party. That case involved thirty-five discriminatees
who had been hired by a Ford plant in Kentucky pursuant to the district court's order. In
relevant part, the union explained:
In a layoff situation of, for example, 35 persons which reaches into but not beyond
the ranks of employees with seniority dates between the discriminatees' rejection
of 1969 and their hiring in 1974, the first 35 persons (excluding persons hired
more recently than the discriminatees) affected would be held harmless. If the
remedy should go to the 35 discriminatees, they are in effect given the wage and
fringe benefit protection they would have had if they had not been wrongfully
rejected when they applied in 1969. If it goes to 35 incumbents, they in turn are
protected against any loss caused by the grant of retroactive seniority to the
discriminatees. In other words, in any contingency the discrimininatees are
restored fully to the job protection they would have had but for the employer's
violation of their rights, without prejudicing or diminishing the earned layoff
seniority of the incumbent work force.
Id at 7 (footnote omitted).
288. Id at 5-11.
289. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARv. L. REv. 2151, 2210-12 (2013).
290. Interestingly, while the UAW's plan was not adopted by the Court, the union later
managed to achieve similar protections for members through negotiation. In 1984, GM
agreed in union negotiations to create the "jobs bank," a program providing retraining
benefits for displaced workers, as well as 95% of former wages for laid off employees who
had at least one year of seniority, until a new position was found. Sharon Silke Carty, Labor
Talks May Tiptoe Around Jobs Bank, USA TODAY (July 27, 2007, 1:46 PM), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/autos/2007-07-23-uaw-talks-jobs-bankN.htm; Erik de
Gier, Paradise Lost Revisited: GM and the UAWhi Histoical Penspective, CORNELL UNIV.
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other words, by making the employer the common enemy against
whom both groups were seeking full employment, the union may have
been able to build ties between the two groups, lessening the negative
effects of perceived competition between them.291
Finally, some unions have made explicit appeals to rank-and-file
solidarity in order to win support for litigation designed to eliminate
discrimination. This work has sometimes played out behind the
scenes, as in United Steelworkers ofAmerica v Weber... There, the
union initially sought the support of reluctant rank-and-file members
for negotiated affirmative action plans by invoking the possibility of a
future adverse court decision that would result in a remedy of the
court's own devising. The union argued that it was better for the union
and employer to work out a plan to deal with the effects of past
discrimination in advance, to avoid ceding control to unpredictable
judges."' To be sure, the Steelworkers' appeal could be viewed as a
somewhat cynical attempt to generate support from whites based on
ILR SCH. 3 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1029&context-intlvf. Much like the proposal in Fmraks; the jobs bank program
reduced the threat of layoffs and helped maintain UAW ranks even as the auto industry faced
decline.
291. In their famous work, The Robbems Cave Experiment Intergroup Conflict and
Cooperation, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues showed that friction between two groups,
which had been created through "conditions of competition and rivalry," could be reduced if
the two groups had to work together to achieve a superordinate goal. MUZAFER SHERIF ET
AL., THE ROBBERS CAvE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 198 (1988).
To be sure, the situation presented here is somewhat different than the one Sherif studied.
Most importantly, it is not clear that discriminatees and incumbents have a shared
superordinate goal. For Sherif, a superordinate goal is one that is "compelling and highly
appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained by the
resources and energies of the groups separately," but here, the precise problem is that white
workers obtained jobs at Bowman without the "resources and energies" of-indeed, at the
expense of-the discriminatees. Muzafer Sherif, Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of
Inteigroup Confict 63 AM. J. Soc. 349, 349-50 (1958). However, there is potential for labor
unions whose leaders are committed to nondiscrimination to reframe the goal in
discrimination cases as obtaining jobs (or at least wages and benefits) for both groups of
workers. See Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 379, 402-03
(discussing the possibility for LGBT advocates to "reframe the debate to achieve gay rights"
so as to create superordinate goals shared by communities of color). If both groups can
commit to working together to achieve that goal, then Sherif's study suggests that working
together in pursuit of that common goal could decrease racial tension among union members.
See also Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 62 (2010) ("Norms
about group identity and outsider exclusion appear to be particularly easy to socialize.
Experimental work in social psychology suggests that in contests over scarce resources,
group identity norms, particularly norms to exclude, quickly become salient.").
292. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
293. Malamud, supm note 120, at 205 ("[I]t had been the threat of seniority lawsuits-




interest convergence.294 However, it occurred in the context of efforts
undertaken by union leadership both in court and at the bargaining
table to undo the effects of past discrimination, suggesting that even if
the appeal was merely strategic, the union's leadership held a broader
commitment to racial equality.
More public, but also perhaps more problematic, was the union's
statement in Intemadonal Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States,295
in a brief arguing against the expansion of the retroactive seniority
principles developed in Bowmarz "Teamsters early understood that
employers played off black against white to undercut the wages and
conditions the unions were attempting to establish. Accordingly, IBT
unions have made special effort to organize minorities, and are color
blind with respect to participation in union affairs and application of
collective bargaining contracts."296  In other words, unlike the
Steelworkers' approach to winning over reluctant white rank-and-file
members, the Teamsters' invocation of solidarity was deployed as a
post-lawsuit defense against charges of discriminatory behavior.
In sum, unions have pursued a variety of strategies to attempt to
respond to the divergent interests of members. The most promising of
these in terms of promoting long-term solidarity between white
workers and workers of color are those that seek to change members'
perceptions of the source of the conflict (for example, shifting their
focus from competition between discrimination victims and unwitting
beneficiaries of discrimination to a discriminating employer), or to
persuade members either to consider social justice, or, at a minimum,
take a more nuanced and strategic view of their own interests.
In the next Subpart, I turn to another concern relevant to unions'
litigation positions: whether the case supports or threatens unions'
freedom or ability to bargain.
C Valuing Freedom To Bargain
Get it throughhkdusial organaton . . . .9
294. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conveigence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (arguing that school desegregation was achieved
when it became pragmatically desirable to powerful white interests).
295. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
296. Brief for Petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters, supm note 268, at 30-
31 (footnote omitted).
297. MELVYN DUBOFSKY, HARD WORK: THE MAKING OF LABOR HISTORY 73 (2000)
(listing slogans associated with the Industrial Workers of the World).
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Because one primary function of unions is to bargain on behalf of
groups of employees, one might expect that they are uniquely sensitive
to cases that either limit the scope of their bargaining authority or else
decrease their bargaining strength by undermining existing
agreements. Conversely, unions may support litigation efforts that
would bolster their bargaining power by mandating wages or benefits
typically sought through bargaining. Indeed, unions' Supreme Court
litigation positions suggest union concern with both issues.
Unions have explicitly invoked freedom to bargain in Supreme
Court briefs. For example, consider Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v Massachusetts, in which the Court reviewed a state law requiring
that certain health insurance plans cover minimum mental health care
benefits.' One may expect unions to have supported this law-unions
often support laws strengthening the social safety net both because of
their social justice commitments and because they can increase their
leverage at the bargaining table by improving workers' alternatives to a
collectively bargained agreement. Yet both the AFL-CIO and a New
Hampshire-based local union opposed the law, arguing that it was
preempted by ERISA. Both unions cited their desire to be free to
bargain away mental health benefits (or other benefits that might be
required under similar state laws) in exchange for pay or other
benefits. As the AFL-CIO stated, "[S]tate laws of the type at issue
here make [collective bargaining] more, rather than less, difficult by
substituting for private decision-making a state-imposed requirement
... regardless of whether the employees desire such benefits or would
prefer other benefits (or higher wages) instead."299
A similar focus on freedom to bargain played out much
differently in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v Pyettfo. Pyett dealt with labor
unions' abilities to waive members' rights to pursue discrimination
claims in federal court and instead require them to pursue the
negotiated grievance procedure, culminating with arbitration. Unlike
in Metropolitan Life, the AFL-CIO and Change to Win argued that
unions flatly lacked the authority to strike such a deal with employers.
298. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
299. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2, Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724 (Nos. 84-325, 84-356), 1984 WL 565632, at *2. Similarly, the
local union argued, "Such laws frustrate the ability of such plans to provide the benefits
requested by their members, and increase both the cost of the plans themselves and of their
administration." Brief Amicus Curiae of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Local 421 Health & Welfare Fund et al., in Support of Appellants at 2, Metro. Life Is. Co.,
471 U.S. 724 (Nos. 84-325, 84-356), 1984 WL. 565644, at *2.
300. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
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On closer inspection, however, the unions' reasoning in Pyett was
entirely consistent with Metropolitan Life. As the federations
explained:
The ADEA claims advanced by the Plaintiff-Employees in this case
challenge an employment action that Local 32BJ agreed to in advance
. ... The Union only agreed to that substitution after receiving
assurances that the new provider of security services would not
undermine the area wage rates. Local 32BJ decided not to arbitrate the
ADEA claims challenging that action based on its view that the
agreement the Union had made with Temco in this regard was not
discriminatory. If that agreement could be attacked by the adversely
affected employees through the contractual grievance-arbitration
procedure, it would most certainly undermine "the employer's
confidence in the union's authority."30'
In other words, the federations feared that waiving employees' rights to
go to court would actually impair unions' abilities to negotiate
meaningfully with employers, because it would cede their control over
which grievances reach arbitration.
The AFL-CIO's argument in Metropolitan Life would have meant
that no Massachusetts employer-union or nonunion-would be
required to provide mental health coverage under the statute. However,
in other cases, unions have argued for special treatment based on their
status as employees' bargaining representatives. That is to say, unions
sometimes argue that unions and employers can agree to do things
together that would be illegal if done by employers on their own. For
example, in USAirways v Bamett, the union distinguished seniority
systems contained in collective bargaining agreements from employer
created seniority systems, arguing that only collectively bargained
seniority systems could trump accommodation of an employee in need
of reassignment because of a disability.302 Similarly, the AFL-CIO has
argued:
[E]mployers and labor organizations should be, and are, free-under
the ADEA-to negotiate health insurance plans that favor older
workers. And, it is our position that this reading of the ADEA protects
301. Brief of the AFL-CIO & Change to Win as Amici Cwriae in Support of
Respondents at 6-7, Pyeti 556 U.S. 247 (No. 07-581), 2008 WL 2817677, at *6-7 (citations
omitted) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967)).
302. Brief of the AFL-CIO in Bamet supm note 135, at 4-6.
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the interests of all workers in this regard by giving necessary play to the
collective bargaining process."0
And finally, as discussed above, the Steelworkers argued in Weber that
a negotiated affirmative action plan was lawful, while a government-
imposed plan would exceed the scope of the Civil Rights Act."*
So far, this Subpart has focused on cases in which unions litigate
with an eye toward preserving union and employer freedom to bargain
over particular benefits. However, in other cases, unions have
supported increased substantive protections for employees instead of
the flexibility to take or leave particular benefits. For example, the
AFL-CIO argued in favor of a Maine law requiring employers to offer
a severance payment to employees affected by plant closings.o. and a
New York law forbidding pregnancy discrimination in employee
benefits and requiring employers to offer paid sick leave to pregnant
and disabled employees."o' The difference may be explained by a
combination of factors, including the leverage the union is likely to
have at the bargaining table, how frequently unions bargain for the
benefits at issue, and the union's political commitments. Thus, it is
relevant both that union leverage is likely at its nadir when a plant is
shutting down and that unions have a particularly strong track record
of advocating for equal pay for women and against pregnancy
discrimination.
Thus, the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried,
Machine and Furniture Workers explained in Gedukddg v Aiello that its
efforts to litigate pregnancy discrimination cases supported its repeated
attempts to win insurance coverage for pregnancy-related issues during
bargaining."o' Likewise, in its amicus brief in support of the Affordable
Care Act, the AFL-CIO explained:
303. Brief of the AFL-CIO & UAW, as Amici Claiae in Support of Petitioner at 2,
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) (No. 02-1080), 2003 WL
21649479, at *2.
304. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
305. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (No. 86-341), 1987 WL 880547.
306. Motion for Leave To File a Brief Amici Curiae & Brief for the AFL-CIO & the
New York State AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)
(No. 81-1578).
307. Brief of the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO-CLC, as Amicus Curiae, supra note 128, at 4-5 ("As collective bargaining agent, the IUE
has during the past two years been engaged in negotiations with approximately 400
employers for the purpose of securing for female employees the right to all the same benefits
as other disabled employees for periods of disability due to childbirth or the complications of
pregnancy.").
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[It] has an interest in this issue because the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by its affiliated unions almost universally
provide for employment-based health insurance for covered employees
and their immediate families. The system of employment-related health
insurance has come under tremendous pressure from the steadily
increasing costs of health insurance coverage. The Affordable Care Act
addresses the problem of increasing insurance costs in part by
encouraging universal coverage, and the minimum coverage provision
is essential to the Act's plan for achieving that purpose.30
And, during the 2013 Term, Change to Win and the AFL-CIO filed a
joint amicus brief in Hollhgsworth v Perry, the case challenging
California's Proposition 8. The unions first explained that their interest
in the case stemmed from the fact that unions commonly "bargain and
advocate for domestic partner benefits in union contracts" and then
argued that Proposition 8 harmed workers with same-sex partners.309
Evidently, then, unions' litigation positions are influenced by their
bargaining goals. However, context matters: Unions' perceptions of
their own bargaining strength and the desirability of the benefit at issue
determine whether unions seek flexibility or certainty.
IV. UNION LITIGATION AS SOCIAL GOOD
"The law wi1 never make men free;
it is men who have got to make the law free."' 0
This Part discusses some of the strategic benefits that labor's
model of Supreme Court litigation might provide to the larger
progressive social movement community and suggests ways that
unions could more effectively further the goals of social movement
unionism through Supreme Court advocacy.
The Part begins by discussing a critique of litigation-based social
change efforts and the "law and organizing" model of social
movement litigation. It suggests that unions are inherently well-suited
to bundle their litigation efforts with other forms of advocacy and that
308. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners Suggesting
Reversal of the Decision Below on the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue, supra note 73, at
1.
309. Brief of AFL-CIO & Change to Win as Amici Curine Supporting Respondents &
Suggesting Affirmance, supm note 136, at 1-2.
310. Bryan-Paul Frost, Reiion, Nature, and Disobedience i the Thought of Ralph
Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
355, 371 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2003) (quoting Henry David Thoreau,
Slavery m Massachusetts, in WALDEN AND OrHER WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 663,
669 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1937)).
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many unions adhere to the law and organizing model virtually by
default. Next, I turn to the benefits and drawbacks of coalition work in
the Supreme Court, focusing on what unions might gain from
litigating in coalition with other social movement groups and vice
versa. Finally, I suggest that greater publicity of unions' Supreme




Critics of litigation-focused reform efforts have charged that the
pursuit of social change through court decisions "can narrow issues
and atomize collective grievances, undermining broader collective
action."3 12  Additionally, they argue that the opportunity costs of
spending precious time and resources on litigation, rather than other
types of activities, may be too great-particularly when "favorable
judicial decisions without similarly favorable outcomes on the ground"
are relatively frequent occurrences."'
However, other scholars have argued that litigation can be an
important component of a broader organizing strategy. Derrick Bell
observed that a litigation campaign is more than the sum of the
resulting decisions: "Litigation can and should serve lawyer and client
as a community-organizing tool, an educational forum, a means of
obtaining data, a method of exercising political leverage, and a rallying
point for public support."314 More recently, adherents of the law-and-
organizing model have urged attorneys to "supplement conventional
litigation strategies with community education programs, link the
provision of legal services with membership in organizing groups, and
become directly involved in organizing campaigns."' This way, even
unsuccessful litigation can yield beneficial results if it spurs other
311. Michael E. Tigar, Cnsis hi the Legal Profession: Don't Mourn, Oiganze!, 37
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 539, 540 & n.2 (2011) ("Joe Hill, alias of Industrial Workers of the World
organizer Joseph Hillstrom, was executed in Utah in 1915. 'Don't Mourn, Organize' is a
paraphrase from his last letter." (citing PHILIP S. FONER, THE CASE OF JOE HILL 96 (1965))).
312. Albiston, suprd note 226, at 63 (describing criticisms of the use of litigation as a
social reform strategy).
313. NeJaime, supra note 228, at 943.
314. Bell, supranote 221, at 513.
315. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V Eagly, A Citical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443, 447-48 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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forms of collective action."' As Douglas NeJaime has persuasively
reasoned: "Litigation loss may, counterintuitively, produce winners.
When savvy advocates lose in court, they may nonetheless configure
the loss in ways that result in productive social movement effects and
lead to more effective reform strategies.""'
Unions are particularly well situated to mix litigation with other
advocacy strategies; in fact, the law and organizing model itself "hails
back to a more militant era of labor activism-of 'protests, illicit
strikes, and pickets."'" In fact, the Supreme Court itself recognized
this connection in Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainmen v Virgiaia ex rel.
Virginia State Ba"19 and subsequent decisions regarding the legality of
union legal referral plans that recognized that unions had a legitimate
interest in ensuring that workers were able to enforce their rights under
statutes that the unions had lobbied for in the first place.320
Today, union tactics-even if less militant-still go hand in hand
with traditional litigation efforts. For example, in Lawyers, Unite,
Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly tell the story of the Workplace
Project, an organization created to help Latino workers on Long Island
enforce their rights at work.321 In one case, the Workplace Project
"represented two workers owed several thousand dollars in back wages
by their employer."3 2   That representation entailed filing a lawsuit,
alongside which the Workplace Project also engaged in a traditional
union tactic-picketing outside the defendant-employer's store.323 The
316. NeJaime, supm note 228, at 954 & n.57 ("[P]roductive indirect effects of
litigation [include] raising consciousness, driving fundraising, legitimizing a cause, and
influencing other state actors.").
317. Id. at 945.
318. Jesse Newmark, Legal Aid Affairs: Collabomting with Local Governments on
the Side, 21 B.U. PuB. INr. L.J. 195, 293 (2012) (quoting Orly Lobel, The Paradox of
ExtralegalActivism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L.
REv 937, 956 (2007)); see also Cummings & Eagly, supra note 315, at 470 & n.114 ("Labor
lawyers are important precursors to the current generation of law and organizing
practitioners, who focus on enforcing legal rights enacted as a result of the labor
movement.... As advocates committed to the goal of advancing workplace organizing
campaigns, labor lawyers continue to merit recognition as important examples of
practitioners working within the law and organizing model.").
319. 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964).
320. See discussion supra Part II.A.
321. Scott Cummings & Ingrid Eagly, Lawyers, Unite, LEGAL AFF. (2005), http://www.
legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/review-cummings-maraprO5.msp.




project achieved a quick settlement on behalf of the workers, which it
attributed to the picketing.324
While Supreme Court litigation may feel more distant from on-
the-ground organizing efforts than the case described in Lawyers,
Unite, it can still be usefully integrated into a broader organizing
strategy. For example, as discussed in the previous Part, unions often
simultaneously seek benefits for workers both in the courts and at the
bargaining table-union amicus participation in Perry v
Hollingsworth offers only the most recent of many examples.325 Then,
when unions win before the Court, they not only improve workers'
lives, but they may also win another leverage point-if employers
subsequently violate the law, then unions can sue on behalf of
aggrieved employees. Even when unions lose before the Court, they
may, as NeJaime has suggested, nonetheless ultimately succeed in
whole or in part. For example, after their loss in Alden, Maine union
activists were able to persuade the state to provide "most, but not all, of
the protections and benefits that they would have received without
sovereign immunity,"32 including some of the back pay they had
unsuccessfully argued before the Court they were owed.327 Likewise,
after losing General Electric Co. v Gilber 28 a coalition of unions and
other groups succeeded in lobbying Congress to pass the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, and then unions helped ensure employer
compliance with the new law through bargaining, grievances, and
lawsuits.329
A final example reveals the fluidity between unions' Supreme
Court litigation and their organizing efforts. In Citizens United v
FEC, the AFL-CIO filed an amicus brief arguing that prohibitions on
unions' electioneering communications were unconstitutional.33o
However, the Court's decision went farther than the AFL-CIO hoped
324. Id; see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V Eagly, After Public Interest Law, 100
Nw U. L. REV. 1251, 1269-70 (2006) (reviewing JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:
THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005)) (discussing the Workplace Project's picketing
tactics and success).
325. See supra Part III.B. L
326. CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND THE IMPACT OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 137 (2008).
3 2 7. Id.
328. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
329. Judith A. Scott, Why a Union Voice Makes a Real Difference for Women
Workers. Then and Now, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 233, 234-35 (2009).




striking down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's limits on
corporate and union independent expenditures as well.' In response,
the federation called for a constitutional amendment to limit corporate
(though not union) political expenditures.' At the same time, the
2012 presidential election saw unions-which were significantly
outspent by business interests-take advantage of the Citizens Uited
ruling by creating a "Super-PAC" to fund door-to-door canvassing
efforts that leveraged unions' abilities to mobilize their members.
In sum, unions' Supreme Court advocacy is often linked to other
forms of organizing that may take place before, during, or after
litigation. These linkages can be cumulative, with litigation and
organizing efforts reinforcing each other. Further, successful
organizing efforts can lead to more litigation opportunities, creating a
procyclical relationship between law and organizing. Thus, union
litigation in pursuit of social change is particularly promising because
even where the union loses in court, it may be able to pursue its desired
result effectively through its "boots on the ground."
B. Coalitions In and Outside the Labor Movement
You are never strong enough that you don 't need help.334
Unions may litigate with or without the support of their members,
other unions, and outside groups. In this Subpart, I discuss the
opportunities that Supreme Court litigation can provide for unions to
form or strengthen relationships with all of these constituencies.
Labor's history of working hand in hand with other social
movement groups has been mixed. Some of the burgeoning identity-
based movements of the 1960s and 1970s viewed the white working
class as "'bought off' by their affluence and 'white privilege' ... too
economically comfortable and benefited too much from racism,
imperialism, sexism and homophobia to be allies in struggle."3
Likewise, some unions' support of the Vietnam War did little to endear
331. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,319 (2010).
332. Steven Greenhouse, Unions Urge Curtailment of 'Super PACs,' N.Y TIMES,
CAUCUS (Mar. 15, 2012, 11:56 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/unions-
urge-curtailnent-of-super-pacs/.
333. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Leaders Plan To Apply New Clout M Effort for
Obama, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/us/politics/unions-
plan-a-door-to-door-effort-for-2012-election.html.
334. CESAR CHAVEZ, AN ORGANIZER'S TALE: SPEECHES 236 (Ilan Stavans ed., 2008).
335. Capulong, supm note 231, at 135 (footnote omitted).
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them to other progressive causes."' On the other hand, two UAW
lawyers were on hand at the inaugural meeting of the National
Organization for Women, and they played a role in shaping that
organization's approach to the cause of women's equality.337 Likewise,
many unions have long enjoyed close relationships with civil and
immigrants' rights groups.338
Supreme Court litigation presents opportunities for unions and
other groups to work together on either a long-term or a more
temporary basis-"strange bedfellow" coalitions can form for the
limited purpose of arguing a particular point of law or more long-
lasting alliances can manifest. For example, effective Supreme Court
advocates will typically coordinate amicus briefs so that they do not
overlap and instead show a range of policy and doctrinal reasons that
one party's position is correct."' Here, labor unions and federations
will often have special insights into the particular work-related effects
of an issue. These briefs can be especially powerful in cases in which
the connection between the issue presented and American workers is
not initially obvious. For example, in Grutter v Boflhger, the AFL-
CIO was seemingly alone among a long list of amici in arguing that
diversity in higher education was important because of its impact on
336. Id However, other unions opposed the Vietnam War. Charles B. Craver, The
impact ofLabor Unions on WorkerRights and on Other Social Movements, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 267,274 (2011).
337. Mayeri, supm note 230, at 790. While the UAW lawyers supported women's
equality, they argued against pursuing it via the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), citing
concerns that the ERA would invalidate a host of labor and employment laws designed to
protect women workers. Testifying before the United States Senate, Myra K. Wolfgang, who
was then vice president of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International
Union and secretary-treasurer of its local in Detroit, argued:
There are various kinds of protection for women workers provided by State laws
and regulations: (1) minimum wage; (2) overtime compensation; (3) hours of
work, meal and rest period; (4) equal pay[;] (5) industrial homework;
(6) employment before and after childbirth[;] (7) occupational limitations; and
(8) other standards, such as seating and washroom facilities and weight-lifting
limitations. It would be desirable for some of these laws to be extended to men,
but the practical fact is that an equal rights amendment is likely to destroy the laws
altogether rather than bring about coverage for both sexes. Those State laws that are
outmoded or discriminatory, should be repealed or amended and should be handled
on a case-by-case basis.
Equal Rights 1970: Heanngs on SI Res. 61 and S.J Res. 231 Befor the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 31 (1970) (statement of Myra K. Wolfgang, Vice President, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union).
338. Garden& Leong, supra note 241, at 1160, 1205-06.
339. Charles A. Rothfeld, Avoiding Missteps in the Supreme Court: A Guide to
Resources for Counsel, 7 J. Ap. PRAC. & PROCESS 249,253-54(2005).
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workplace discrimination.340 Conversely, input from other groups can
legitimate positions taken by labor unions and federations by helping
to assure judges that the union's position has not been skewed by the
dynamics described in Part Ill.
A second question concerns relationships within the union
movement: to what extent should union officers and labor lawyers
seek input from other unions or union members in shaping their
litigation positions? This question is particularly salient in the amicus
context, where the decision as to whether to file at all, as well as what
position to take, is entirely within a union's or federation's discretion.
Yet it is the amicus context in which union members have traditionally
had the least input, beginning with Arthur Goldberg's "free hand to
select labor cases to take to the Supreme Court and to file amicus
briefs in cases already scheduled for Supreme Court review."34 ' Wle
this approach is of course expedient, and union and federation officers
are elected in part to make decisions in the interest of membership, one
may view this model as a lost opportunity to foster communication
between union members and union leadership about movement
priorities and long-term goals.
V. CONCLUSION
There is scarcely an issue that has not been, and is not, influenced by
labork organzed efforts or lack of them.342
Labor unions and federations have an extensive record of
Supreme Court litigation covering a vast array of substantive areas.
Yet, inexplicably, this litigation has escaped the attention of scholarly
and other audiences, even as a national debate about the appropriate
role of labor unions has taken place. This inattention is especially
surprising because Supreme Court litigation is a significant channel
through which unions can affect the lives of nonunion members and
the structure of American government more generally. Attention to the
scope of unions' Supreme Court practice is particularly timely in light
of the persistent decline over the last several decades in American
340. David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherntly Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good
for Business". The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1548, 1610 n.260 (2004) ("[I]t is telling that, to my
knowledge, the only amicus brief filed in Grutter that made continuation of widespread racial
discrimination and stereotyping against black Americans in employment the centerpiece of its
argument was that of the AFL-CIO.... Significantly, no lawyer from a major corporate law
firm participated in the drafting of that brief.").
341. Stone, supra note 59, at 159.
342. WILLIAM CAHN, A PICIORIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 3 (1972).
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labor union membership; in 2012, only 11.3% of wage and salary
workers were union members.343 Therefore, with membership levels
reflecting an existential threat to the American labor movement, it is
especially important that policy debates focusing on whether to
attempt to revive unions or to undercut them take place against the
backdrop of a complete picture of what unions do, including through
litigation.
343. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membeis Summary, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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